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ABSTRACT
Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities
(September, 1979)
Marcia Ann McKelligan, A.B., Mount Holyoke College
M.A.
,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
The dissertation is an attempt to discover whether
Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities
is a justified and useful one. It is a search for a primary-
secondary quality distinction which is suggested by Locke,
yields results in accord with Locke's and has defensible
implications about the nature and properties of physical
Ob j ects
.
Chapter I briefly examines the history of the distinc-
tion and argues that it is possible to isolate in the
Lockean text five separate versions of the distinction.
Chapter II examines various versions of the view that
the primary qualities of macroscopic objects are essential
to them while their secondary qualities are not. It
argues that the chief problem with these views lies in the
difficulty of establishing that none of the secondary
qualities is essential to the physical objects that have
it. The suggestion is made that at least some of the tra-
ditional secondary qualities are in fact essential to
physical objects.
V
chapter III examines two sets of proposals. First,
it examines versions of a primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction which identify the primary qualities as the
real properties of physical objects and the secondary
qualities as those which are instantiated only by mental
entities. It is argued that this view is impossible to
defend in a non-question—begging way. The second pro-
posal examined is the view that sense-data associated
with the primary qualities resemble physical objects
in some way that the sense-data associated with the secon-
dary qualities do not. It is argued that this view is
largely incoherent.
Chapter IV discusses the suggestion that objects can
gain and lose secondary qualities without undergoing any
physical alteration while primary quality changes require
physical alteration of objects. This view is dismissed
on the grounds that it makes tacit assumptions about the
nature of secondary qualities which, if made explicit,
would constitute part of one of the other versions of the
primary-secondary quality distinction.
Chapter V discusses various proposals that the
secondary qualities are dispositions. These proposals
suggest either that primary qualities are non-dispositional
or that they are dispositions of a different sort from the
secondary qualities. Here it is argued that it is difficult
VI
to find a good argument to show that secondary qualities
dispositions that does not tend to show that primary
qualities, also, are dispositions. Further, it is argued,
if the properties of physical objects are considered
dispositions, it becomes difficult to distinguish among
them in a suitably Lockean way.
Chapter VI examines a set of proposals loosely con-
nected with the notion of property dependency. The most
meritorious of these is the view that the primary qualities
of objects are those which are physically essential to
their microconstituents and that the secondary qualities
of objects are those of their properties their microcon-
stituents either completely lack or possess only contin-
gently. It is argued that this view comes closest to
meeting the standards which inform the dissertation's
search.
Chapter VII summarizes the preceding chapters and
points out some items of philosophical interest concerning
the view endorsed in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER I
Although Locke was not the first philosopher to
posit a difference among sorts of qualities, it is his
name that we most closely associate with the distinction
between primary and secondary qualities of physical ob-
jects. In discussions of John Locke's Essay Concerning
Human Understanding
,
it is often implied that Locke ex-
pressed one coherent and consistent view of the primary-
secondary quality distinction. In this chapter I intend
to show that in fact Locke offers at least six different
suggestions as to how the primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction should be drawn. After a brief discussion of
the history of the problem, I shall present a sketch of
each suggestion. In each case, I make some tentative
criticisms
.
Locke lists size, figure, solidity, extension, motion
or rest, bulk and number as primary qualities. Among
the secondary qualities are color, sound, taste, odor, heat
and coldness, and perhaps, smoothness and roughness.
That Locke confuses several distinct positions on the
difference between these two groups of qualities is not
surprising inasmuch as those philosophers who tackled
the problem before Locke express views on the issue which
superficially sound alike but are in fact diverse.
1
2Traditionally, Democritus is credited with origi-
nating the primary-secondary quality distinction. Only
a few fragments are devoted to this topic. In his
most frequently quoted fragment, Democritus says that
"by convention color exists, by convention bitter, by
convention sweet, but in reality atoms and void."l One
view, then, that we can tentatively attribute to
Democritus is that at least some qualities exist only
"by convention." Presumably, this means that although
the common person believes that certain qualities
like color, bitterness and sweetness exist, these
qualities in fact have no independent existence.
Other fragments express the view that sensible
color, odor and taste are caused by the arrangements
of the atoms which compose a physical object:
Color does not exist by nature. For
the elements have no qualities, neither
the solids nor the void. What is com-
posed of these, however, is colored by
arrangement, proportion, and impulsion,
that is, order, shape, and position,
for appearances arise from these. 2
This quotation from Democritus implies that although
macroscopic things have color, etc., the atoms which
compose them have no color and presumably, no taste or
smell either. Democritus also suggests here that the
color of a thing qualities its appearance rather than
the thing itself, so that macroscopic entities only
3appear to be colored while, like the atoms and the void,
they in fact have no color.
In addition, Democritus postulates correlations be-
tween sensible qualities and the arrangements of atoms.
Theophrastus reports that Democritus assigns a shape to
each quality, making "sweet to consist of fairly large,
spherical atoms. To the quality sour he assigned very
large, rough shapes," and so on. 3 a problem arises here.
If each sensible quality is correlated with a shape,
we should not expect that color, taste and olfactory per-
ceptions could change solely because of a change in the
condition of the percipient. Yet Democritus recognizes
that such phenomena do occur. Theophrastus protests
against this inconsistency in Democritus. He says.
But the one glaring inconsistency
running through the whole account is,
that he no sooner declares savors to
be subjective effects in sense than
he distinguishes them by their figures;
and he points out that the same sub-
stance appears bitter to some persons
and sweet to others and has still a
third quality for some other group.
For the figure cannot possibly be a
subjective effect, nor can one and
the same figure be spherical for certain
persons and of another shape for
others. . . ^
If Democritus holds that, for example, whatever appears
sweet is made entirely of fairly large spherical atoms,
and that whatever appears sour is made entirely of very
large rough atoms, then he must also hold that if a
4given substance can taste sweet to one person and sour
to another, then that substance is both composed entire-
ly of fairly large spherical atoms and composed entire-
ly of very large rough atoms. This is manifestly im-
possible, and such a position is indeed inconsistent.
But it is not clear that this is Democritus' position.
First, he may not mean that whatever is sweet, sour,
etc., is composed entirely of atoms of a particular
shape. Second, he may have wanted to make some sort
of distinction between real and apparent secondary
qualities, so that only things which are really sweet
or sour are composed of the appropriate sorts of atoms.
In that case it is possible that a collection of fairly
large spherical atoms might, under certain circumstances,
produce in tasters a non-sweet sensation. A third
view, then, that we can attribute to Democritus is that
there is some sort of correlation between the micro-
scopic qualities of entities and their macroscopic
qualities. It is difficult to say exactly what
Democritus' theory is, so we can attribute to him only a
sketch of a primary-secondary quality distinction.
In modern times we find philosopher-scientists
making similarly elusive comments about quality differ-
For example, Kepler says.
Only those features of the world in
ences
.
5terms of which we get certain and
consistent knowledge open before us
what is indubitably and permanently
real. Other qualities are not real
qualities of things, but only signs
of them.
. . The real world is a
world of quantitative characteris-
tics only: its differences are dif-
ferences of number alone. 5
Here we have a more sophisticated expression of what
Democritus seemed to be saying. In the world there
are only certain sorts of qualities— apparently, only
ones that can be measured. Therefore, some of the
perceptions we have are not representations of real
qualities, but are mere signs that there exist certain
qualities. Like Democritus, Kepler seems to think
that the so-called secondary qualities are mere appear-
ances and that these appearances are caused, in part,
by the real, quantitative qualities of physical objects.
Galileo proposed at least two means of distin-
guishing primary from secondary qualities. Like his
predecessors, he characterizes primary qualities as
objective, actually inhering in physical objects, while
secondary qualities are subjective, mind-dependent
entities, perception of which is caused by the primary
qualities of things. Galileo also suggests that primary
qualities are essential to bodies while secondary qua-
lities are inessential to them. (This is not surprising
if there are no secondary qualities in bodies.)
6Galileo says,
Nevertheless I say, that indeed I feel
myself impelled by the necessity, as soon
as I conceive a piece of matter or cor-
poreal substance, of conceiving that in
its own nature, it is bounded and figured
in such and such a figure, that in relation
to others it is large or small, that it
is in this or that place, in this or that
time, that it is in motion or remains at
rest, that it touches or does not touch
another body, that it is single, few or
many, in short, by no imagination can a
body be separated from such conditions:
but that it must be white or red, bitter
or sweet, sounding or mute, or a pleasant
or unpleasant odour, I do not perceive
my mind forced to acknowledge it neces-
sarily accompanied by such conditions. ^
We find the most carefully developed version of
the distinction in Boyle, who is credited with having
coined the expression "primary and secondary qualities"
.
Boyle takes secondary qualities to be dependent on
primary qualities, and he says that there is in physical
objects "nothing of real and physical but the size,
shape, and motion or rest of its component particles,
together with the texture of the whole, that results
from their being so contrived as they are."^ So far
Boyle sounds like all the others, but, unlike Democritus
et al. he does not characterize secondary qualities as
mind—dependent . He claims they are dispositions of
objects to effect changes and produce senations in
other entities. As such, they would exist even if there
were no sentient creatures.
They (the sensible qualities) have an
absolute being irrelative to us; for
snow, for instance, would be white and
a glowing coal would be hot, though
there were no man or any other animal
in the world ... as the coal will
not only heat or burn a man's hand if
he touch it, but would likewise heat
wax ... 8
He says further that
if there were no animals there would
be no such thing as pain, yet a pin
may, upon account of its figure, be
fitted to cause pain in case it were
moved against a man's finger ... 9
Boyle makes quite a contribution here, in pointing
out something about the nature of a disposition that
Locke later forgets. According to Boyle, to say that
a glowing coal is hot is to say that it has the power
to burn a man's hand, to melt wax, and to produce sen-
sations of warmth in men's minds, etc. Such a power
can be possessed by a piece of coal even were there
no hands, no wax and no minds, although, without hands,
wax and minds, the power cannot be exercised. Thus,
if secondary qualities are dispositions of objects,
they are not mind-dependent in the way Boyle's pre-
decessors took them to be. Unfortunately, Boyle also
suggests that the secondary qualities are not "real
and physical." It is not clear what Boyle means by
this, but the comment indicates that Boyle vacillates
in either his view of what a secondary quality is or hi
view of what a disposition is.
8The outline above shows that Locke was confronted
with a variety of positions: that primary qualities
actually inhere in bodies while secondary qualities
are mere appearances, not inhering in bodies themselves;
secondary qualities are mind—dependent entities
while primary qualities are not; that secondary qualities
are dependent on primary qualities; that primary qua-
are essential to bodies and secondary qualities
non-essential; that secondary qualities are dispositional
while primary qualities are not. Locke freely adopts
all of these views and adds some of his own. Our task
now is to examine Locke's presentation of these posi-
tions .
To carry out this project it is necessary to try
to understand Locke's use of four terms: 'idea',
'perception', 'sensation', and 'quality'. Locke says
that 'idea' is "that term which . . . serves best to
stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding
when a man thinks." He says he uses it to express
"whatever is meant by phantasm
,
notion
,
species
,
or
whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in
thinking . " To perceive, according to Locke, is the
same as to have an idea: "To ask at what time a man
has first any ideas, is to ask, when he begins to per-
ceive
—
having ideas
,
and perception being the same
9thing. We can say tentatively that Locke uses 'idea'
and 'perception' synonymously.
While 'idea' and 'perception' denote mental phe-
nomena, 'sensation' as Locke usually uses it denotes a
physical event. A sensation is that activity of the
sense organs or brain which produces perceptions or
ideas. It is " such an impression or motion made in some
part of the body as produces some perception in the
understanding . " Sensations can be cotemporaneous
with ideas.
Locke defines 'quality' as the power to produce
an idea or perception in a mind. Qualities and ideas
are distinct. "Thus a snowball having the power to
produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round—the
power to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the
snowball, I call qualities: and as they are sensations
or perceptions in our understandings, I call them
ideas. It has been noted frequently that Locke
sometimes uses 'idea' when he should use 'quality',
but there is a further confusion in the Essay . At one
point Locke says.
To discover the nature of our ideas
the better, and to discourse of them
intelligently, it will be convenient
to distinguish them ^ they are ideas
or perceptions in our minds ; and as
they are modifications of matter in
the bodies that cause such perceptions
^^in us
.
10
Locke, then, not only sometimes uses 'idea' and 'quality'
synonymously, but he also sometimes uses 'idea' synony-
mously with 'modification of matter'. it might be
thought that qualities just are modifications of matter,
but we should be hesitant to attribute this view to
Locke. He says many things to indicate that the two
expressions have different meanings.
In the discussion that follows, 'idea' and
'perception' will be used to refer only to objects of
thought or awareness, and unless otherwise indicated,
restricted in meaning to whatever is usually
meant by 'sense datum'. 'Sensation' will be used as
Locke uses it. 'Quality' will be used without a fixed
meaning. Although Locke defines qualities as powers
to produce ideas in minds, he often speaks as if they
are something more or other than that.- Accordingly, our
usage of the word 'quality' here will vary with Locke's
usage of it.
Locke begins his discussion of primary and secon-
dary qualities by saying.
Qualities thus considered in bodies
are. First
,
such as are utterly in-
separable from the body, in what
state soever it be and such as in all
the alterations and changes it suffers,
all the force can be used upon it,
it constantly keeps; and such as sense
constantly finds in every
11
particle of matter which has bulk
enough to be perceived; and the
mind finds inseparable from every
particle of matter, though less than
to make itself singly be perceived
by our senses: v.g. take a grain of
wheat, divide it into two parts;
each part has still solidity, exten-
sion, figure, or mobility . . .
For division can never take away
either solidity, extension, figure,
or mobility from any body . . . These
I call original or primary qualities
of body, which I think we may observe
to produce simple ideas in us, viz.
solidity, extension, figure, motion
or rest, and number.
Secondly
,
such qualities which
in truth are nothing in the objects
themselves but powers to produce
various sensations in us by their
primary qualities, i.e., by the bulk
figure, texture, and motions of their
insensible parts, as colours, sounds,
tastes, etc. These I call secondary
qualities
.
Essential and Inessential Qualities
Locke indicates early, then, that primary qualities
are essential to bodies; nothing that is a body could
lack any of the determinable primary qualities. No matter
what changes are made in a physical object, it retains
the properties of having some size or other, some shape or
other, some degree of bulk, capability of motion, etc.
Although Locke does not say so, we can assume that
secondary qualities are not essential to bodies; some-
thing can be a body and yet lack the power to produce
sensations of taste, color, odor, sound, etc. We can
12
express the essential-inessential criterion this way:
(LI) Determinable quality Q is primary iff (x) (x is
a body 3 a x has Q)
Determinable quality Q is secondary iff (x) (x
is a bodyoO x lacks Q)
(LI) is, at first glance, a curious position for Locke
to hold. Locke names size, figure, solidity, extension,
motion or rest, bulk, and number as the primary qualities.
(LI), however, yields that an infinite number of qualities
other than these are primary. Being self-identical
,
being red or not red, being six feet long or not six
feet long, being self-identical or red—all of these
are primary according to (LI) . So we must conclude
that even if all the primary qualities are qualities
which all bodies have necessarily, they must have some
other feature which distinguishes them from all the
other qualities that bodies have necessarily.
Furthermore, Locke says later in the Essay that
we do not know the real essences of things. Presum-
ably, though, we are well acquainted with primary
qualities. How, then, can primary qualities be essen-
tial to bodies? Perhaps Locke does not mean that
primary qualities are essential to bodies; instead,
he may mean to say something about the discoverability
of various qualities in bodies. A careful investiga-
tion of an ice cube, for example, would reveal it to
13
have shape, size, solidity, etc. and to lack taste and
smell. From this fact, one can derive an attempt at
a primary-secondary quality distinction, and I shall
discuss it in more detail later.
Secondary Qualities as Powers
Another way of formulating a primary-secondary
quality distinction is suggested by the passage quoted
above: Locke says that secondary qualities are powers
of bodies to produce sensations and ideas. Perhaps,
then, primary qualities are not powers, but something
else instead. Like the view that the primary qualities
are the essential properties of bodies, the position
that primary qualities are not powers is not readily
attributable to Locke. He defines qualities as powers
to produce ideas. Since primary qualities are quality
paradigms, we should expect that they, like the secon-
dary qualities, are powers. Perhaps Locke means that
secondary qualities are merely powers while primary
qualities are powers plus something else. We have
already seen that Locke does not explicitly equate
qualities with modifications of matter. Perhaps primary
qualities are both powers to produce ideas and modifi-
cations of matter. This sounds something like the view
held by several contemporary philosophers that secondary
14
ax© dispositional qualities while primary
qualities are non-dispositional
. I shall take up this
position later. At present it should suffice to say
that Locke has no well developed view here.
Secondary Qualities as Dependent on Primary Qualities
Later in chapter viii, Locke hints at another
primary-secondary quality distinction. In paragraph
13 he says that
a violet, by the impulse of such
insensible particles of matter, of
peculiar figures and bulks, and in
different degrees and modifications
of their motion, causes the ideas of
the blue colour, and sweet scent of
that flower to be produced in our
minds
.
Here, as in his opening passage, Locke is proposing
that secondary qualities are in some way dependent
on primary qualities. If we take the secondary qua-
lities to be powers to produce in us ideas of color,
smell, taste, sound and the like, then the passage
above suggests that if an object lacked primary qualities,
it would also lack such powers. Roughly, then, the
distinction would be this:
(L2) Quality Q is primary iff 0 (Ex) (x has Q and<^(EQ')
(Q ' is distinct from Q and x has Q'
and Q depends on Q ' )
)
Quality Q is secondary iff Q (x) (x has Q3(EQ’)(Q'
is distinct from Q and x has Q' and Q
depends on Q
' )
)
15
The notion of dependency here is too vague to be of
much use to Locke. Given an intuitive understanding
of dependency, it seems as though some primary qualities
are dependent on others, e.g., size is dependent on shape
and vice versa. (L2) then rules that size and shape
are secondary qualities, a result we want to avoid.
Clearly, what we need is something like:
(L2') Quality Q is primary iff 0 (Ex) (x has Q and
/^(EF) (F is a secondary quality and
X has F)
)
Quality Q is secondary iff O (x) (x has QD (EF)
(F is a primary quality distinct
from Q and x has F)
)
(L2') may express a truth, but it will never do as the
makings of a defintion because it is circular. To use
it, we need to know beforehand which qualities are
primary and which are secondary. We cannot find out
which qualities are primary without knowing which are
secondary and vice versa.
More sophisticated expressions of this version of
a primary-secondary quality distinction will be taken
up in Chapter VI
.
The Resemblance Thesis
At II,viii,15 Locke takes a different approach
to the distinction. He began by distinguishing sorts
of qualities in bodies. Here he distinguishes among
16
ideas of qualities. He says,
The ideas of primary qualities of
bodies are resemblances of them, and
their patterns do really exist in the
bodies themselves, but the ideas pro-
duced in us by these secondary
qualities have no resemblance of them
at all. There is nothing like our
ideas existing in the bodies them-
selves. They are, in the bodies
we denominate from them, only a power
to produce those sensations in us . . .
This Lockean doctrine, that primary quality ideas are
patterned after something in objects while secondary
quality ideas are not, is sometimes known as the
Resemblance Thesis. Many of Berkeley's arguments
against Locke are directed toward the thesis. Although
Locke offers it as a means of distinguishing among
ideas, it can be formulated to express a distinction
among qualities.
(L3) Quality Q is primary iff the ideas produced in
sentient creatures by Q resemble Q.
Quality Q is secondary iff the ideas produced
in sentient creatures by Q do not
resemble Q.
The notion that a resemblance relation can obtain
between an idea and one of its causes is a tangled one.
First of all, Locke does not tell us how much or in
what way an idea must be like an object if it is to be
said to resemble that object and this omission raises
serious questions, e.g., can the idea or sensum pro-
17
duced in us when we look at a sphere be said to resemble
a sphere? Worse— can the idea we get when we observe
ii^otion resemble motion? One does not know how to begin
to answer such questions. Second, it is not clear
that there is any sense in which an idea can be said
to resemble a quality or an object. Third, it seems
we could never know which of our ideas resemble the
external world and which don't, since by hypothesis
here, we never directly observe the external world.
The depth of these difficulties can be indicated by re-
turning to the text.
At II,viii, 15-18, Locke offers three arguments,
ostensibly in support of the Resemblance Thesis. They
are about the heat of a flame, the whiteness and cold-
ness of snow and the whiteness and sweetness of manna.
Since the arguments are similar in form, I shall con-
fine my attention to the flame argument. Locke says,
Flame is denominated hot and light
. . . he that will consider that the
same fire that, at one distance pro-
duces in us the sensation of warmth,
does, at a nearer approach, produce
in us the far different sensation of
pain, ought to bethink himself what
reason he has to say— that this idea
of warmth, which was produced in him
by the fire, is actually in the fire ,
and his idea of pain, which the
same fire produced in him the same
way, is not in the fire.
On a straightforward reading of the passage above,
18
the conclusion argued for is that the idea of warmth
that a person has when he is near a fire is not in the
fire, but surely Locke is not arguing for that non-
controversial position. Rather he is trying to argue
for the apparently different view that there is no
warmth in the fire. Here is a plausible rendering of
the argument:
(1) At distance d, fire produces in us an idea of
warmth.
(2) At distance d', fire produces in us an idea
of pain.
(3) If there is no pain in the fire, then there
is no warmth in the fire.
(4) There is no pain in the fire.
(5) There is no wannth in the fire.
The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) requires some
explanation. Locke does not offer one, but perhaps
what he has in mind is this: if we walk slowly toward
a fire and attend to our ideas, we will notice that
at first we feel warmth, later we feel warmth and some
pain, and finally we feel no warmth, only pain.
What we experience is a series of ideas that seem in-
timately related to one another, so intimately related
that it is tempting to say that there is only one
sensation in our bodies, a sensation that is mild at
one time and intense at another. I do not wish to
19
comment on the plausibility of this view because it is
not crucial to our purpose here. What is crucial is
how we read premise (4) and hence, the conclusion.
The most natural interpretation of (4) is that the
fire feels no pain. If we read (4) this way, we should
take (5) to mean that the fire feels no warmth. We
must suppose that Locke thinks that such a commonplace
needs no argument.
Ordinary usage suggests another reading. We
sometimes say that wounds and the like are not painful.
What we mean is that they cause us no pain. Premise (2),
however, tells us that fire does cause pain, so this
reading must be rejected also. It looks as if we are
left with this: in the fire there is nothing like the
pain that we feel. If this is supposed to mean some-
thing other than that the fire does not feel pain,
it is hard to say what it is. Perhaps Locke is using
the notion that pain is essentially mental and there-
fore does not inhere in physical objects, but from this
it does not follow by the reasoning above that warmth
is essentially mental. In fact, it is tempting to
be perverse and say here that pain and warmth are per-
ceptions, mental entities, while their cause is not.
The cause of each is the warmth of the fire, thus there
is no warmth in the fire.
20
The manna argument is even more troublesome, for
there Locke wants to compare sweetness and whiteness
with "acute pains or gripings." One begins to wonder
if the Resemblance Thesis has any cognitive content.
Certainly Locke is not at all helpful here. He gives
us no idea of what it means to say that there is some-
thing like pain or a feeling of warmth in a physical
object. Several contemporary philosophers have revived
the Resemblance Thesis and I shall consider them in
a later chapter.
The Berkeley-Reid Interpretation
It should be noted that the fire, snow and manna
arguments are solid evidence that Locke takes secondary
qualities to be ideas. There is a further argument
that supports this interpretation of Locke. At II,viii,
20 we find the "almond argument".
Pound an almond, and the clear white
colour will be altered into a dirty
one, and the sweet taste into an
oily one. What real alteration can
the beating of the pestle make in
any body, but an alteration of the
texture of it?
We can formulate Locke's argument as follows:
(1) When an almond is pounded its taste and color
change
.
(2) When an almond is pounded, nothing in the almond
changes except its texture.
21
(3) Neither the taste nor the color of an almond
is identical with its texture.
(4) The taste and the color of an almond are not
qualities of the almond.
As Bennett^^ points out, the argument begs the question.
Support for premise (2) would pre-suppose the truth of
the conclusion. Locke's question-begging is not im-
portant here. The noteworthy thing is that Locke seems
to suppose that color and taste are ideas or perceptions,
subjective, mind-dependent entities.
Both Berkeley and Reid, in attacking Locke's
primary-secondary quality distinction, attribute to
Locke the view that the difference between primary and
secondary qualities is ontological, that primary qualities
actually inhere in objects—they are "real and physi-
cal," in Boyle's words—while secondary qualities,
being in some way mind-dependent entities, do not
actually inhere in physical objects. At least two
interpretations of this position are possible: (1)
primary qualities are qualities while secondary qua-
lities are not qualities at all but rather transient,
mind-dependent entities; and (2) both primary and
secondary qualities are qualities, but while primary
qualities have physical objects as instances, secon-
dary qualities can and/or do have as instances only
22
ideas or sensa. Further elaboration of these two
interpretations is presented in a later chapter.
Alteration of Qualities
A final version of the primary-secondary quality
distinction is suggested by Locke's porphyry argument
( II , viii , 19 ) . We can formulate the porphyry argument
this way:
(1) When the light is shut off, the color of the
porphyry vanishes.
(2) V7hen the light is shut off, no alteration is
made in the porphyry.
(3) If, when the light is shut off, the color of
the porphyry vanishes and no alteration is
made in the porphyry, then what vanishes is
not in the porphyry.
(4) What vanishes is not in the porphyry.
(5) What vanishes is the color of the porphyry.
(6) The color of the porphyry is not a quality of
the porphyry.
Again, this argument can be taken as support for the
Berkeley-Reid interpretation of Locke, but another
interpretation is possible. The argument suggests
that an object's secondary qualities can be changed
without making any physical change in the object it-
self, while primary qualities of an object can be
changed only by making some physical alteration in
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the object. (L4) is an attempt to formulate what is
hinted at here.
(L4) Quality Q is primary iff (x) (x is a body and
X loses Q at time t o x undergoes a
physical alteration at t)
Quality Q is secondary iff O (Ex) (x is a body and
X loses Q at time t and x does not
undergo a physical alteration at t)
Note that (L4) can distinguish among only determinate
qualities, since it is doubtful that objects can lose
their determinable primary qualities. (L4) raises
problems in that we must determine what counts as a
physical alteration and we must do it in a non-question-
begging way. Furthermore we must determine when it is
proper to say that an object undergoes a quality change.
If we say that an object’s qualities change every time
they appear to change--a principle at work in the por-
phyry argument--we must explain why we want to say
that objects sometimes retain their determinate primary
qualities when those qualities appear to change. If
we attempt a distinction between real and apparent
qualities, we will, I believe, be at a loss to find a
case where an object's real secondary qualities change
without an accompanying physical alteration. I believe
that (L4) alone cannot serve to distinguish primary from
secondary qualities, since we cannot evaluate it with-
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out having at least a sketch of a theory about the
nature of secondary qualities.
Tertiary Qualities
Before I conclude, I should say a word about
tertiary qualities. Locke says very little about them.
They are "barely powers," he tells us. Most contem-
porary philosophers ignore them. Those who do discuss
them classify them with either the primary or the
secondary qualities, depending on the analysis they
offer. I, too, see little reason for a third category
of qualities and will discuss the tertiaries only when
consideration of them might be enlightening. For the
most part, it will be clear from the primary-secondary
quality distinction under scrutiny which of the terti-
aries belong in which group of qualities.
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CHAPTER II
Where Locke first offers an account of primary
qualities, he suggests that primary qualities are in
some sense essential to bodies. Locke does not use the
terms 'essence' or 'essential'. He says,
Qualities thus considered in
bodies are.
First, such as are utterly
inseparable from the body, in
what estate soever it be; and
such as in all the alterations
and changes it suffers, all
the force can be used upon it,
it constantly keeps. 1
This passage suggests that primary qualities are essen-
tial to bodies in a standard sense of 'essential', namely,
that bodies possess primary qualities necessarily; that
is, anything that is a body has all of the primary
2qualities in every possible world. If being essential
or necessary to bodies is taken as a distinctive char-
acteristic of primary qualities, we can infer that for
Locke, secondary qualities are inessential to bodies,
possessed by them only contingently.
Just below the quoted passage, Locke points to
another characteristic of primary qualities. He says
that primary qualities are
such as sense finds constantly
in every particle of matter which
^
has bulk enough to be perceived.
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This passage seems to say that every, time a body is
perceived, it is perceived to have primary qualities.
In other words, for any body and any perceiver of that
body, the body produces in the perceiver an idea of
some primary quality. Locke's phrasing here suggests
that the percipient receives ideas of all of the primary
qualities, so that we should strengthen the claim to:
for any body and any perceiver of that body, the body
produces in the perceiver ideas of each of the primary
qualities
.
We cannot attribute such a view to Locke, however.
He holds that we receive the idea of solidity solely
from the sense of touch. Since not all instances of
perceiving a body are instances of touching that body,
it is patently false that bodies always produce an idea
of solidity in their perceivers. What Locke might
mean is that if one investigates a body under optimal
conditions, that is, employs all five senses when
observation conditions are at their best, then one will
receive ideas of all the primary qualities. Again we
must assume that this feature is one Locke thinks
peculiar to primary qualities and that he believes that
even under optimal conditions, one or more of the secon-
dary qualities may fail to be perceived by the observer.
After the latter quoted comment, Locke says that
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primary qualities are those which
the mind finds inseparable from
every particle of matter, though
less than to make itself singly
be perceived by our senses. ^
Although Locke does not use the word 'conceive' here,
it is natural to interpret this passage as dealing with
our conception of material objects. Locke has already
noted how we are sensually affected by material objects;
now he turns to our thinking about them. In this pas-
sage Locke seems to be saying that one cannot conceive
of a body as lacking any of the primary qualities.
Locke may be relying here on the philosophical rule of
thumb that whatever is inconceivable is impossible
to infer that it is impossible that a body should lack
any of the primary qualities.
The claim Locke makes here is ambiguous between
a claim about conception in the sense of mental picturing
and a claim about non-pictorial conception. When
Berkeley deals with this claim, he relies on the former
reading.^ It is on the latter interpretation that the
assertion seems to imply that primary qualities are
essential to bodies. The implication that one can con-
ceive of a body as lacking any or all of the secondary
qualities is ambiguous in the same way as the claim about
the primaries.
The similarities among the three claims Locke makes
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warrants their being examined together. Accordingly, I
shall deal with each of them in this chapter. l shall
attempt to clarify them and then show that none of the
^h.ree constitutes a successful distinction between
P^^iniary and secondary gualities. Since the second is
the most easily disposed of and consequently the least
intriguing, I shall deal with it first. Then I shall
consider the third claim and finally, the first, which
is the most philosophically persuasive. In each case,
I restrict my attention to macroscopic physical objects
and ignore their microscopic parts, molecules, atoms
and so on. A discussion of the properties of these
microentities can be found in Chapter VI.
Optimal Perception of Physical Objects
To facilitate expression of the claim that percep-
tion of a body under good conditions always results
in the perception of all the primary qualities, I intro-
duce the term ' 0-perceives
' ,
which will be used to
capture the notion of perception with all available
senses under favoravle or optimal conditions. I stipu-
late that a person, S, 0-perceives a physical object, x,
in a world, w, only if (1) S is a normal percipient in
w, (2) S employs all his sense apparatus, and (3) obser-
vation conditions are favorable to a degree that is
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average or better than average in w. We 0-perceive
objects in this world only if we employ all five working
senses under standard or better observation conditions;
that is, there is light, a medium for the transporting
of sound waves, etc.
Now we can express the view that 0-perception of
objects in this world always results in the production
of ideas of all the primary qualities as:
(P) (x) (Q) (Q is a primary quality and P 0-perceives
X 3 X produces in P an idea of Q)
where 'x' ranges over material objects and 'P' ranges
over perceivers. This claim has at least initial
plausibility with regard to the so-called "fully
determinable" primaries, the qualities that appear on
the Lockean lists--size, shape and so forth. It has no
plausibility with regard to other qualities Locke would
wish to call primary, namely, determinates of the fully
determinable primaries— the properties of being six
feet tall, square and so forth. Locke has been often
and justly criticized for ignoring the determinable-
determinate quality distinction, but his oversight is,
at least in principle, remediable. The obvious solution
is to try to define primary qualities as those qualities
which either have some feature, F, or are determinate
forms of some quality which has F. Now we can consider:
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(El) (A) Quality Q is primary iff either (i) Q(P) (x)
(P 0-perceives xO x produces in P
an idea of Q)
or (ii) Q is a
determinate of some quality which
satisfies (A-i)
.
(B) Quality Q is secondary iff (i) 0 (EP) (Ex) (P
0-perceives x and it is not the
case that x produces in P an idea
of Q)
and (ii) Q fails to
satisfy (A-ii)
.
Before we can evaluate (El) it is necessary to
add a word or two about the notion of determinable and
determinate qualities. This classification of qualities
relative to one another was proposed by W.E. Johnson
7in his Logic
,
and I strive here to use the terms
'determinable' and 'determinate' as Johnson does with
the exception that I apply them to properties rather
than to terms. The most enlightening thing that Johnson
says about the twofold classification is this:
I propose to call such terms as
colour and shape determinable
s
in
relation to such terms as red and
circular which will be called
determinates ... To predicate
colour or shape of an object ob-
viously characterizes it less de-
terminately than to predicate of
it red or circular ; hence the for-
mer adjectives may be said to be
indeterminate compared with the
latter
.
Johnson's characterization of determinate and determin-
able qualities is a bit sketchy, yet attempts to forma-
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lize the distinction have not been clearly successful.^
I do not attempt to make progress here where others
have failed. I trust that the distinction is suffi-
ciently well understood to be useful and that the
problems which infest it due to its vagueness will not
seriously affect our evaluation of either (El) or sub-
sequent proposals which employ the notions of deter-
minableness and determinateness. I shall simply take
'P is a determinate of Q' as primitive and say that a
quality, Q, is determinable only if there is some other
quality, P, such that P is a determinate of Q. It
should be noted that a quality can be a determinable
in relation to its determinates and yet be a determinate
in relation to a further quality or qualities.
Now we are ready to comment on (El) . Someone
might object that in requiring that the truth of (A-i)
be logically necessary, I violate the spirit of Locke's
claim. Indeed, it seems that Locke might mean to make
a purely empirical claim when he says that primary
qualities are "such as sense constantly finds in every
particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived."
Perhaps we should formulate Locke's insight in terms
of physical necessity, and possibility. Consider:
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(i22) (A) Quality Q is primary iff either (i)[Q (P) (x)
(P 0-perceives xo x produces in P
an idea of Q)
or (ii) Q is a
determinate of some quality which
satisfies (A-i)
.
(B) Quality Q is secondary iff (i)^(EP) (Ex) (P
0-perceives x and it is not the
case that x produces in P an idea
of Q)
and (ii) Q fails to
satisfy (A-ii)
.
One problem with (E2) is that it yields the result
that color is a primary quality, for it is physically
necessary that any sighted 0-observer of a physical
object receive an idea of color. The 0-perception of
any physical object results in the production of an
idea of some color or other. Even perfectly trans-
parent objects appear to have darkly colored borders;
besides, the 0-observer of a transparent object sees
the colors of the objects behind it. (E2) also rele-
gates hardness and warmth (or cold) to the category
of the primaries, for every time a normal perceiver
touches a physical object, he receives an idea of some
degree or other of both hardness and warmth. In view
of these difficulties, it is clear that (E2) cannot
express the distinction Locke had in mind; neither does
it accord with any of the standard intuitions which have
prompted philosophers to try to draw a primary-secondary
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quality distinction.
We are forced to return to (El)
,
only to find that
^hile it lacks the difficulties of (E2)
,
it has some
of its own. Unlike (E2 )
,
(El) does not legislate that
color, hardness and warmth are primary qualities. Al-
though we do in fact always perceive these qualities
in the objects we 0-perceive, it is not logically
necessary that we do so. In some possible world our
0-perceptions would fail to produce ideas of, say,
color. For instance, we can imagine a world which lacks
light. In that world, observation of objects even under
the optimum conditions of the world might fail to
produce color ideas in percipients. But if we can
imagine worlds in which color perception does not occur,
we can imagine worlds in which perception of the Lockean
primary qualities does not occur. In any world in
which sight is impossible due to lack of light and
touch is impossible due to extreme repulsion between
atoms, all perception of the Lockean primary qualities
might fail. Where (E2) is too broad, (El) seems too
narrow. It looks as though (El) yields the result
that no quality is primary since no quality is perceived
in every possible world.
The failures of (El) and (E2) suggest that perhaps
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Locke's comment is not meant to express a primary-secondary
quality distinction. In a discussion of the passage
we are dealing with, Aaron claims that instead, it is
meant as an explanation of how we come to have certain
beliefs about primary qualities. Explicating Locke,
Aaron says.
Whenever we experience a physical
object ideas of the primary qualities
are part of the whole complex idea
which we then have. Here is our
first suggestion of the constant pre-
sence of these qualities in things. H
Aaron takes Locke to be offering an account of how
we come to believe that all physical objects always
possess all of the primary qualities. However, if
Locke is appealing to certain facts about perceptual
episodes to either imply or justify the quality distinc-
tion he draws, then he errs seriously. We have al-
ready seen that one does not always perceive all of
the primary qualities when one observes an object, and
the deficiencies in (El) and (E2) show that an intro-
duction of the notion of an optimal kind of observation
solves that problem but creates others. The perceptual
evidence Aaron cites does not justify the Lockean classi-
fication of qualities.
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Conception of Physical Objects
We turn to the view that it is inconceivable that
a physical object should lack any of the primary qualities
^hile it is conceivable that an object lack any or all
of the secondary qualities. We can express this view as:
(E3) (A) Quality Q is primary iff either (i) jp(x) (y) (x
is a body 3 (y conceives of x3 y con-
ceives that X has Q)
)
or (ii) Q is a
determinate of some quality which
satisfies (A-i)
.
(B) Quality Q is secondary iff (i)^(Ex) (Ey) (x is
a body and y conceives of x and y
conceives that x lacks Q)
and (ii) Q fails to
satisfy (A-ii)
.
(E3j appears to yield results more in accord with
Locke's lists of primary and secondary qualities than
do (El) and (E2)
.
For instance, no one can conceive
of a body as lacking extension or shape or size or
number or solidity or capability of motion, but it
seems that one can conceive of a body as lacking odor
or taste or sound. If (E3) is to legislate that color
is a secondary quality, it must be that one can conceive
of a body as lacking color. Berkeley, however, objects
to this assertion. He says.
For my own part, I see evidently that
it is not in my power to frame an idea
of a body extended and moving , but I
must withal give it some colour or
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other sensible quality, which is
acknowledged to exist in the mind . . .
is arguing that it is impossible to conceive
of a body as having the primary qualities while lacking
of the secondary qualities. He does not say that
an object must be conceived as having every secondary
quality, only that it must be conceived as having at
least one. Unfortunately, Berkeley does not support
his contention; he seems to think that everyone, upon
reflection, would find himself similarly unable to
conceive of a body as lacking all of the secondary
qualities. The most reasonable interpretation of
Berkeley's remark is that what he has in mind is con-
ceiving a body by mentally picturing it. If we re-
phrase Berkeley's claim to "No one can form a mental
representation of a body that lacks every secondary
quality," its truth becomes obvious. Suppose I form a
mental picture of a tree. In addition to picturing it
as extended, shaped, etc., I shall also picture it as
having some color or other. But I need not picture it
as having color; I might imagine, instead, touching a
tree in the dark. If I do this, I must imagine the tree
as having some degree of roughness and some degree of
hardness. The point is that no matter how I form my
mental picture of the tree, I must picture it as having
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some secondary quality or other.
Berkeley’s view, however, does nothing to show that
(E3) is inconsistent with the Lockean quality distinction.
Even if we read 'conceive' as Berkeley does, Berkeley's
claim about mental representation is consistent with (E3)
.
From the premise that every conceived body must have
some secondary quality or other, it does not follow that
there is any particular secondary quality that a con-
ceived body must have. On (E3)
,
for a quality to be
primary, it must be that no conceived body could lack
it or some determinable of it, but Berkeley's claim
does not attribute that characteristic to any of the
secondary qualities.
However, Berkeley's comments do suggest a way in
which, if we read 'conceive' in the Berkeleyan manner,
we can suggest, that (E3) excludes from primacy at least
one of the qualities traditionally considered primary.
We said earlier that one might conceive a body as lacking
color by picturing touching the body in the dark. Or,
as was hinted, one could imagine a body as lacking
hardness by forming a mental impression of it that omits
tactual impressions. If we can exclude these secondary
qualities from our mental representations of bodies,
then perhaps we can exclude solidity from them as well
by forming a visual impression of the object and exclu-
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ding from it the idea of solidity. Solidity is, for
Locke, resistance to penetration; we receive the idea
of this quality from the sense of touch. If we form
a mental picture of an object and omit from that pic-
ture all tactual impressions, then we neglect to include
in our representation an idea of solidity. If this is
possible, (E3) relegates solidity to the secondary
qualities
.
This argument, however, is not sufficient to show
that (E3) is defective, because the sense in which
'conceive' is used in (E3) need not be the sense of
'conceive' in which it means mentally picture or repre-
sent. Locke probably has in mind a non-pictorial sense
of 'conceive' in which it is more properly applicable
to propositions and means the same as 'consider' or
'entertain'. So it remains to evaluate (E3) under
this other reading of 'conceive'. This is a different
matter. The claim that such and such a state of affairs
is inconceivable is often taken as equivalent to the
claim that that state of affairs is logically impossible.
Then the claim that it is inconceivable that a body
lack quality Q is equivalent to the claim that it is
impossible that a body lack Q.
One problem with assertions about what is or is not
conceivable is that they are difficult to falsify. If I
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say that I cannot conceive that a body lack some alleged
secondary quality, say color, it will be difficult for
a proponent of (E3) to prove that I am mistaken. The
best the proponent of (E3) can do in this situation is
to appeal to some other theory on which color is inessen-
tial to bodies and by this tactic try to show that I
must be able to conceive that a body lack color since
bodies possess color only contingently. Accordingly,
we turn to the first of Locke's views, that primary
qualities are possessed by bodies necessarily while
secondary quality possession is a contingent matter.
Our verdict on this view will dictate our final evalua-
tion of (E3)
.
Essential Qualities of Physical Objects
One apparent problem with attributing to Locke the
view that primary qualities are essential to bodies
is that he denies that we can know the real essences of
things. If, then, we are acquainted with the primary
qualities of a body, they cannot constitute its real
essence, which is unknown to us. This alleged problem
is not a serious one for two reasons: (1) the view that
primary qualities are essential to bodies while secondary
qualities are not is philosophically interesting
whether Locke held it or not; and (2) if 'essential' is
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taken to mean necessary rather than belonging to the real
or nominal essence of, then Locke says little or nothing
which conflicts with the doctrine under consideration.
Locke says that the word ’essence' has "several signifi-
cations . "
First, essence may be taken for the
being of anything, whereby it is what
it is. And thus the real internal, but
generally (in substances) unknown con-
stitution of things, whereon their dis-
coverable qualities depend, may be
called their essence. This is the pro-
per original signification . . .
Secondly ... it being evident that
things are ranked under names into
sorts or species only as they agree to
certain abstract ideas, to which we
have annexed those names, the essence
of each genus
,
or sort, comes to be
nothing but that abstract idea which
the general, or sortal . . .name stands
for . . .These two sorts of essences, I
suppose, may not unfitly be termed the
one the real , the other nominal essence .
It is clear from this passage that Locke cannot identify
the primary qualities of objects with their real essences,
for their real essences are, in some sense, the cause of
their discoverable properties rather than being identical
with any of them. The primary qualities of objects are
0027tainly
,
on Locke's view, discoverable and therefore
cannot be considered part of Lockean real essences. So,
the fact that Locke says that the real essences of things
are unknown to us does not preclude our attributing to
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him the view that primary qualities are "essential,"
in the humble sense of "necessary," to bodies.
Nominal essences, according to Locke, are not hidden
from us. For instance, Locke calls the nominal essence
of gold "all those properties of colour, weight, fusi-
bility, fixedness, &c., which makes it to be gold, or
gives it a right to that name."^^ Since its color is
part of the nominal essence of gold, we cannot identify
nominal essences with any set of primary qualities, so
even Locke's remarks about nominal essences are irre-
levant to the view we are about to consider. The fore-
going makes it clear that Locke does not identify es-
sences, nominal or real, with properties a thing has
necessarily, although surely all Lockean real and nominal
essences are possessed necessarily by the things that
have them
.
We are free now to take a closer look at the view
that what distinguishes primary from secondary qualities
is that the former are necessary to bodies while the
latter are not. First, we introduce a notion of contin-
gency of qualities:
Quality Q is contingent (Ex) (Qx) and (Ex) (^Qx) .
This notion of contingency is introduced in order to
eliminate from consideration all those qualities which
^VGirytlning hss n.GCGSs3iriXy
; wg wsnt to focus on thosG
qualitiGS which bodies have necessarily. Now we can
consider
;
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(E4) (A) Quality Q is primary iff either (i) Q is con-
tingent and (x) (x has Q:i> qx has Q)
or (ii) Q is a
determinate of a quality that satis-
fies (A-i)
.
(B) Quality Q is secondary iff (i) Q is contin-
gent and (x) (x has Q^ Ox lacks Q)
and (ii) Q fails to
satisfy (A-ii)
.
To see how (E4) works we can consider two qualities,
being extended and having an odor. (E4) will rule that
being extended is primary; it is a contingent quality
and everything that is extended is so necessarily. On
the other hand, having an odor appears to be a secondary
quality since it is possible that something that does
in fact have an odor— a rose, for instance—might lack
it. But (E4) is unsatisfactory. Consider the property
of being identical with some proposition or other. It
is a contingent property and all those things that have
it have it necessarily. (E4), then, yields the result
that the property of being identical with some propo-
sition or other, a property which all physical objects
lack, is primary. We need a more restrictive criterion.
Consider then:
(E5) (A) Quality Q is primary iff either (i) Q is con-
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gent and (x) (x is a material objectsQx has Q)
or (ii) Q is a
determinate of a quality that
satisfies (A-i)
.
(B) Quality Q is secondary iff (i) Q is contingent
and (x) (x is a material object and
X has QD <>x lacks Q)
and (ii) Q fails to
satisfy (A-ii)
.
(E5 )
,
although an improvement on (E4)
,
is not satisfac-
tory either. Consider the property of being a material
object; it satisfies (E5-A) and must therefore be con-
sidered primary if (E5) is accepted. Consider also the
property of failing to be a proposition; (E5) legislates
that it, too, is primary. The property of being com-
posed of atoms may be primary according to (E5)
;
simi-
larly, Lockean real essences, the "unknown constitutions
of things," are primary. These properties are not at
all the sorts of property that Locke has in mind when
he makes a primary-secondary quality distinction. Some-
one might argue that this is merely a technical diffi-
culty, one which could be overcome by the addition of
appropriate restrictive clauses. Indeed, perhaps we
could lessen the number of counterexamples to (E5) by
making more and more refinements in it, but I suggest
that we could never add enough restrictions to (E5)
to free it from difficulties altogether. The problem
45
with (E5) is not merely technical. (E5) is intended to
express the view that the primary qualities are those
contingent properties possessed necessarily by material
objects while the secondary qualities are those possessed
only contingently by material objects. As long as we
retain this intuition, the criterion that expresses it
will include among the primaries many properties other
than the Lockean primaries. It may be that all the
traditional primaries are necessary to all material
objects, but many other properties are so as well.
Being necessary to material objects is not a distinctive
feature of the traditional primary qualities. It should
be noted also that a list of all those properties that
fail to belong to the essences of material objects would
differ radically from any traditional list of the
secondary qualities.
(E5) suffers a more important defect. It legis-
lates that at least three of the qualities traditionally
considered secondary are instead primary qualities; (E5)
rules that color, hardness and temperature are primary
qualities, for no material object could lack any of these
properties. This is relatively easy to show.
Suppose we do as many philosophers do and regard
these three qualities as dispositions to produce certain
46
sensations in some sentient creature under specifiable
conditions
. It seems clear that even a world which
lacks light and the possibility of contact between
objects can, if it has material objects, have colored
and hard and warm objects. The objects in that world
would have the capacity to produce visual and tactual
and thermal sensations in sentient creatures were they
removed to a world more like ours. If they have the
requisite dispositions, which they must, then they
have color and some degree of hardness and some degree
of heat. It seems to be impossible for an object to
have all of the traditional primary qualities and yet
lack the dispositions I have mentioned, since, we think,
the possession of these primary qualities is sufficient
for the possession of these dispositions. An object
which lacks solidity might very well lack the dispo-
sition to produce colored visual sensations in us, but
if it is possible for an object to lack solidity then
(E5) is deficient in characterizing solidity as a
secondary quality. If, instead of regarding color as
the disposition to produce color sensations in sentient
creatures, we regard it as the disposition to reflect
light, it becomes even more obvious that material ob-
jects are necessarily colored.
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If, instead of regarding the secondary qualities as
dispositions, we regard them as non-dispositional
,
it
may seem that in a world without light things simply
lack color or that in a world without pressure- and
temperature-sensitive percipients things lack hardness
and heat. We may ask, however, whether there is any
good reason to so tie the possession of secondary qua-
lities to the actual behavior of objects. We do not
require of an object that it actually behave in some
characteristic way before we attribute primary qualities
to it. Consider a possible world in which there is
nothing material but a stationary one-foot cube. We
would not hesitate to say that this cube is solid,
although it does not actually engage in the kind of
behavior characteristic of solid objects. It does not
resist penetration, support other bodies or produce
tactual sensations in perceivers; it is nonetheless
solid, we believe. If we are told that something is
a material object, we believe that it is solid even
if, because of its environment, it fails to act in ways
which are common to solid things.
It is just as natural, I think, to say that the
cube in question is colored, has a certain degree of
heat, and has a certain degree of hardness, even though
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no light, warms nothing and is touched by
nothing. If we say that to be colored is to have some
sort of surface structure, that to have heat is to have
some degree of mean molecular kinetic energy, and that
to have some degree of hardness is to have some level
of mean molecular density, then it is obvious that the
solitary cube must have all these properties. If,
on the other hand, we say that in order to have a
particular secondary quality an object must actually
appear to some sentient creature in some particular
way
,
we make a requirement for secondary quality posses-
sion without making a corresponding requirement in the
case of primary qualities. I doubt that there is any
non-question-begging justification for such a discri-
mination among qualities. There is an enduring preju-
dice that objects have secondary qualities only if they
are actually perceived to have them, while objects have
primary qualities no matter what. Since this belief is
not self-evident, it requires some supporting argument.
The argument would have to show not only that secondary
qualities are not identifiable with intrinsic physical
features of objects but also that the secondary qualities
are not identifiable with dispositions to behave in
particular ways. It is unlikely that this tall order can
be filled.
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There is a view which entails that secondary qualities
are inessential to material objects in that they are not
possessed by material objects at all, but rather qualify
mental entities only. The arguments for this view, however,
are notoriously weak. The view that secondary qualities
are possessed only by mental entities will be fully dis-
cussed in the following chapter.
I think we should conclude, then, that (E5) is
inadequate to the task of distinguishing primary from
secondary qualities. It does, of course, draw a dis-
tinction among qualities of objects, but that distinc-
tion bears little resemblance to the traditional one.
Since (E5) fails, (E3) must fail as well, in just the same
way; it calls primary some qualities which are usually
classified as secondary and some which are traditionally
conceived as belonging outside of the primary-secondary
quality grouping altogether.
Conclusion
The Lockean passages we have examined have failed
to yield a satisfactory solution to the problem of how
to distinguish primary from secondary qualities. We
have discussed three versions of the distinction. The
first, that primary qualities are more often perceived in
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objects than are the secondary qualities is simply false.
When we introduced the notion of an optimal kind of
perception, we found that at least some of the secondary
qualities are to be constantly found in bodies perceived
under optimal conditions.
The second version, that it is inconceivable that
a body lack any of the primary qualities, was dismissed
as difficult to evaluate unless it is interpreted as
to the third view, that bodies possess primary
*5'^^lities necessarily while they possess secondary quali-
ties only contingently. There are problems with this
view, however. One, perhaps minor, problem is that the
traditional primary qualities are not the only ones that
physical objects possess necessarily; similarly, contin-
gent possession by physical objects does not distinguish
the secondary qualities from all others. The more serious
problem is that it is doubtful that all of the traditional
secondary qualities are only contingently possessed by
macroscopic physical objects. It appears that objects
could not fail to have at least some of the traditional
secondaries, e.g., color, hardness or softness, roughness
or smoothness, temperature. If we hope to discover a
way of distinguishing between the traditional primary
and the traditional secondary qualities we should move
in some other direction.
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Perhaps, however, we need not make too sharp a turn.
We have been restricting our attention to macroscopic
physical objects. We might, instead, concentrate on
the microconstituents of those objects and ask whether,
at the microscopic level, objects have primary qualities
necessarily and secondary qualities only contingently,
or not at all. This project will be undertaken in
Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER III
Two of Locke's versions of the primary-secondary
quality distinction are so intertwined in both the Lockean
passages and the work of Locke's commentators that they
merit examination together. One of these is what histo-
rians of philosophy often call the Berkeley-Reid inter-
P^^tation of Locke s primary— secondary quality distinction
(hereafter, BR)
. The other version we can call the
Resemblance Thesis (hereafter, RT)
.
Typically, BR is characterized as the view that Locke
takes primary qualities to be real, objective qualities of
objects while what we call secondary qualities are not in
fact qualities of physical objects, but rather ideas,
sensibilia, or, perhaps, qualities possessed by sensibilia.
Some of Locke's arguments for RT presuppose the truth of
BR. RT is expressed by Locke's claim that ideas of primary
qualities are "resemblances" of them while ideas of secon-
dary qualities do not "resemble" anything in the object.
Many of Berkeley's and most of Reid's attacks on Locke are
directed toward this doctrine.
In this chapter I shall deal with BR and RT separately
as much as possible. First, I shall consider Locke's version
of BR, his arguments for it, and Berkeley's criticisms of
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them. I shall also consider an additional argument for
something like BR which has been offered recently by J.L.
Mackie. Second, I shall discuss Locke's version of and
arguments for RT
, criticisms of it from both Berkeley
and Reid, and further considerations in its favor from
Mackie. I hope to show that both BR and RT are seri-
ously defective. Finally, I shall consider a contem-
porary version of a primary-secondary quality distinction
which combines BR and RT. I do this in order to point
out the futility of trying to draw a primary-secondary
quality distinction along such lines.
The Berkeley-Reid Interpretation of Locke
The following three quotations from contemporary
scholars of British Empiricism are representative of the
standard reading of Berkeley and Reid. Jonathan Bennett
writes
,
What Berkeley attacked was the thesis
that, while primary qualities are in
objects, secondary are not because they
are ideas and are therefore in the mind."^
Reginald Jackson tells us that
the distinction which Locke was supposed
by Berkeley and Reid to have drawn, is
between qualities of bodies . . . and
ideas, sensations, or in current termino-
logy, sensibilia (supposed not to exist
independently of the perception of them
and to be the effects of the action of
bodies on minds.) ^
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In discussing Berkeley's attack on Locke's distinction
between primary and secondary qualities, D.M. Armstrong
says
,
The moral Berkeley draws from this is
that, since the secondary qualities are
confessedly mere "ideas," the primary
qualities must be equally "ideas"
. . .
he points out that some of the arguments
that Locke used to try to establish the
subjectivity of the secondary qualities,
would, if valid, apply equally to the
primary qualities. 3
Both Berkeley and Reid have been criticized by
commentators for misinterpreting Locke. Reginald
Jackson says of Locke's primary-secondary quality
distinction that it
has been represented, both by Locke's
immediate successors and by a number
of modern critics, in a way which is
not only opposed to Locke's defini-
tions of these terms, but which is
also most awkwardly related to his
distinction between "Qualities" and
"Ideas." ^
After stating that Berkeley and Reid attribute BR to
Locke, Jackson tells us that Locke's distinction is one
between qualities (primary) and powers (secondary) . One
of Jackson's motives for attacking Berkeley and Reid is
charity to Locke. Locke does announce that he intends
to distinguish among kinds of qualities, not between
qualities and ideas. Furthermore, a quality-power dis-
tinction is incompatible with BR inasmuch as powers.
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even if fundamentally different from qualities, are
"in", at least in the sense of attributable
to, objects. That BR violates Locke's stated intentions
is a reason for thinking that Locke does not hold BR.
Jonathan Bennett, who, like Jackson, attributes
to Locke a quality-power distinction, thinks Berkeley
errs in his interpretation of Locke. ^ Although Bennett
^^^lizes that Locke says many things that sound very
much like BR, he blames their presence in the Essay
to carelessness on Locke's part. According to Bennett,
Berkeley was taken in by Locke's comments that secon-
dary qualities are not "in" the object. One such comment
occurs at II,viii,17 of the Essay :
But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness,
are no more really in them (bodied than
sickness or pain is in manna.
Bennett dismisses Berkeley's interpretation of Locke
by saying.
Locke's 'not in the object' remarks
about secondary qualities are . . .
flimsy and inconsiderable; we can-
not explain them except through his
having somehow drifted from his
central insight . . . and really
that is all that can be said about
them. °
Bennett is right when he implies that we cannot reconcile
Locke's "not in the object" remarks with the rest of his
discussion of primary and secondary qualities. Bennett
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suggests three reasons why Locke drifts into speaking
of secondary qualities as if they were mere ideas .
^
The most plausible of these is that Locke takes too
seriously his comparison between secondary qualities
and pains, sickness and the like and slips into equa-
ting secondary qualities with mental states. Whatever
the reason, it is certain that Locke frequently indul-
ges in ways of expressing himself which strongly suggest
a theory like BR.
In paragraphs 16-20 of Book II, chapter viii, Locke
presents four arguments, ostensibly in support of the
Resemblance Thesis, which he has just stated at II, viii,
15. The first three lean heavily on the notion that
secondary qualities exist only when they are being per-
ceived. Here Locke opens the door for the attribution
to him of BR. In other places where Locke suggests BR,
it is plausible that he is indulging in his usual careless-
ness about the use of the word 'idea', but the objective-
subjective distinction is made so blatantly in this por-
tion of the discussion that one can conclude only that
Locke makes it intentionally. Thus Berkeley and Reid,
in attributing BR to Locke, make no more serious an error
than do Bennett and others in attributing a quality-power
distinction to Locke; in their attempts to saddle Locke
with a consistent position, they ignore those sections
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of the Es^ which conflict with their chosen interpre-
tations
.
It IS worth noting at this point that those die-
hards who wish to maintain in the face of contrary
evidence that Locke never holds anything like BR will
have difficulty interpreting Locke's arguments in
II, viii, 16-20 in such a way that they have any force at
all. A look at the arguments will make this point
clearer. After comparing the warmth of fire with the
pain it produces, Locke says.
Light, heat, whiteness, or coldness are
no more really in them [fire and snowj
than sickness or pain is in manna.
Take away the sensation of them; let
not the eyes see light or colors, nor
the ears hear sound; let the palate
not taste, nor the nose smell, and all
colors, tastes, odours, and sounds, as
they are such particular ideas, vanish
and cease, and are reduced to their
causes, i.e., bulk, figure, motion of
parts
.
(II , viii ,17)
the secondary gualities of manna Locke says.
Why the pain and sickness, ideas that
are the effect of the manna, should
be thought to be nowhere when they
are not felt; and yet the sweetness
and whiteness, effects of the same
manna on other parts of the body, by
ways equally as unknown, should be
thought to exist in the manna, when
they are not seen or tasted would need
some reason to explain.
(II, viii, 18)
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Locke continues,
Let us consider the red and white
colours in porphyry. Hinder light
from striking on it, and its colours
vanish.
(II , viii , 19)
It could be argued that in these passages, Locke is not
trying to persuade us of BR— that secondary qualities
exist only while they are perceived—but rather that
ideas of secondary qualities exist only while they are
perceived. This latter claim, of course, does little
to support BR and is at least consistent with a quality-
power distinction. But it is obvious that it says
nothing about ideas of secondary qualities which is not
equally true of ideas of primary qualities. One should
wonder why Locke would go to so much trouble to point
out that some ideas are mind-dependent, an assertion
which supports no primary-secondary quality distinction
because only trivially true.
It is more natural to conclude that in these pas-
sages Locke identifies secondary qualities with secondary
quality ideas and distinguishes them from their physical
causes, the primary qualities of objects. Secondary
qualities exist only while they are being perceived, in
contrast to the primary qualities of bodies, which "are
really in them , --whether anyone's senses perceive them
or no
.
( II , viii , 17
)
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To evaluate Locke's primary-secondary quality
*^^2ti^ction here, we need to reconstruct his line of
reasoning. Locke offers two sorts of arguments to show
that secondary qualities are mind-dependent. One sort
compares secondary qualities with pains and other mental
phenomena and concludes on that basis that secondary
qualities are subjective. The other sort of argument
attempts to show that secondary qualities vary with the
condition of the observer and the environment--e
.
g
.
,
the colors of the porphyry vanish when the lights go out;
no alteration need be made in a physical object in order
to change its secondary qualities, hence these qualities
cannot be in physical objects. Having established to
his satisfaction that secondary qualities are not in
the object, Locke concludes that the only qualities
objects really possess are the primaries (and perhaps
the tertiaries)
. Since there is every reason to believe
that secondary quality ideas (secondary qualities) are
caused by some quality or collection of qualities in
objects, it must be that secondary quality ideas are
caused by the primary qualities. Hence we have BR, an
objective-subjective primary-secondary quality distinc-
tion.
Locke's reasoning here is seriously flawed. First,
both of Locke's arguments for BR are defective. As
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Berkeley has shown so well, the arguments Locke uses
to try to prove that secondary qualities are mind-depen-
dent work just as well to show that primary qualities
are mind—dependent
. In the first case, Locke gives us
no reason to think that an analogy exists between pains
and secondary quality ideas which does not also hold
between pains and primary quality ideas, and in the
second case, Locke ignores the obvious fact that pri-
mary quality ideas vary as much with the condition of
the percipient as do secondary quality ideas. Further-
rnore, Locke seems to forget what he suggests earlier
in the Essay
,
that secondary qualities may be identi-
fied with the powers of bodies to produce certain kinds
of ideas and may thus be considered real, objective
qualities of objects.
Berkeley's treatment of Locke and his arguments
against BR are very familiar, but I wish to stress two
facts about them. One it is certain that Berkeley
attributes BR to Locke.
They who assert that figures, motion,
and the rest of the primary or original
qualities do exist without the mind in
unthinking substances do at the same
time acknowledge that colors, sounds,
heat, cold, and suchlike sensations
do not—which they tell us are sensa-
tions existing in the mind alone, that
depend on and are occasioned by the
different size, texture, and motion of
the minute particles of matter.
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Two, Berkeley's arguments against BR are based on the
assumption that arguments similar to the ones Locke uses
to show the subjectivity of secondary qualities can be
used to show the subjectivity of primary qualities as
well, and, as has been pointed out many times, Berkeley
never endorses these arguments but rather uses them to
reveal an inconsistency in Locke.
In short, let anyone consider those
arguments which are thought mani-
festly to prove that colors and
tastes exist only in the mind and
he shall find they may with equal
force be brought to prove the same
thing of extension, figure, and
motion. Though it must be confessed
this method of arguing does not so
much prove that there is no exten-
sion or color in an outward object
as that we do not know by sense which
is the true extension or color of
the object. ^
Berkeley's arguments against Locke here are decisive.
Locke never succeeds in isolating important features
of secondary quality ideas that are not shared by primary
quality ideas.
There are philosophers, however, who are not convinced
by Berkeley's arguments. One such commentator is J. L.
Mackie. In a recent book, Mackie asserts, like
Jackson and Bennett, that Berkeley distorted Locke's
primary-secondary quality distinction.^^ It is diffi-
cult to know exactly what to say about Mackie 's attack
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because it seems misdirected. Mackie attributes to Locke
a primary-secondary quality distinction that combines
RT with a dispositional-non-dispositional quality dis-
tinction, and it is this sort of view which Mackie wishes
to defend against Berkeley. Mackie claims to find that
Berkeley s arguments are largely ineffective and con-
cludes that the Berkeleyan assault is no threat to
Locke's primary-secondary quality distinction.
Mackie s project does a disservice to Berkeley in
two ways. One, although Mackie evaluates Berkeley's
arguments as criticisms of a primary-secondary quality
distinction that combines RT with the assertion that
secondary qualities are, unlike the primaries, mere
dispositions, Berkeley's arguments in the passages
Mackie discusses are in fact directed towards a dif-
ferent view, namely, a combination of BR and RT. Second,
Mackie conpletely ignores Berkeley's arguments against
RT, a fundamental part of the view that Mackie wants to
defend
.
Mackie deigns to take somewhat seriously three of
Berkeley's arguments. The rest, he says, "amount to
little more than ingenious satire and rhetoric.
The first argument is really a set of arguments in which
Berkeley tries to show that illusions occur as frequently
in primary quality perception as in secondary quality
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perception. Mackie explains,
Berkeley develops at great length the
argument that illusions occur equally
in our perception of primary qualities.
This argument he quickly waves aside.
But this, as we have seen, is simply
beside the point, since the distinc-
tion does not rest at all upon the
mere fact that illusions occur with
the secondary qualities.
In this discussion Mackie seems to be saying, first,
that Berkeley takes it that Locke's case for a pri-
mary-secondary quality distinction rests heavily on the
f^ct that illusions sometimes occur in secondary quality
perception. In response to this, Mackie says, Berkeley
proceeds to point out that primary quality perception
often produces illusions too. Mackie then hastens to
inform us that Locke's primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction depends very little, if at all, on the fact
that illusions occur in secondary quality perception.
He concludes that since Berkeley's arguments are aimed
at a consideration upon which Locke does not rely, they
are, for the most part, irrelevant.
It remains to account for Mackie 's refusal to
acknowledge these arguments as critical to Locke's
position. This can be simply explained. Mackie be-
lieves that Locke proposes an adequate primary-secondary
quality distinction, yet he recognizes that several of
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the passages in Book II, chapter vii of the Essay are, if
taken as arguments for the distinction, not very strong.
Therefore, he ignores them as arguments. As we will see,
Mackie believes that the strongest argument in favor of
a primary-secondary quality distinction is an ontological
economy argument provided by the physical sciences.
Because of this, he chooses to overlook some of the more
familiar arguments that Locke presents.
Mackie discusses two more of Berkeley's arguments:
the argument that all sensible qualities seem to coexist
in the same place, and the argument that it is impossible
to conceive of an object that has primary qualities
but no secondary qualities. Mackie ultimately rejects
both of these. I do not wish to deal with either of
them here. The latter has been discussed in Chapter II,
and the former is, as Mackie suggests, question-begging
against a view which maintains that things are not always
as they seem.
As we have noted, Mackie rejects BR in favor of a
marriage between RT and a dispositional analysis of
secondary qualities. However, in defending his view,
Mackie presents an argument which could conceivably be
used in support of BR, or at least in support of one part
of BR, the view that objects do not possess secondary
qualities. Mackie 's argument concerns the way material
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objects are supposedly conceived of and dealt with by the
physical sciences. Mackie reminds us that Locke was
moved by developments in the science of his day. He
points out that,
It had long been known that sound is a
vibration in the air, and Hooke, Huygens,
and Newton were trying out wave and cor-puscular theories of light. In the de-
velopment of any such theory it is simply
superfluous to postulate that there are,in material objects, in the air, or in
the light, qualities which are at all like
sounds as we hear sounds or colours as
we see colours.
Mackie adds.
. . . the literal ascription of colours as
we see colours, and the like, to material
things, to light, and so on, forms no
part of the explanation of what goes on
in the physical world in the processes
^hich lead on to our having the sensations
and perceptions that we have, but, by
contrast the features actually used in the
construction of such explanations still
include spatial position and arrangement and
motions (of various sorts) of items most
of which are countable at least in princi-
ple.
From these two quotations it is clear how Mackie 's
argument proceeds. One notes that while the Lockean
primary qualities play an essential role in scientific
explanation of the behavior of physical objects, the
secondary qualities play no role at all. Then, using
a principle of ontological economy which adjures the
philosopher to refrain from postulating the existence of
entities which serve no explanatory purpose, one concludes
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that material objects possess no secondary qualities.
Such an argument would, if sound, support BR,
Mackie draws a more cautious conclusion from his
premises, however. He concludes that
the physical considerations
. . . show that
there is no good reason for postulating . .
. thoroughly objective features which^ resem-
ble our ideas of secondary qualities.
In other words, Mackie uses the argument to support a
version of RT, and it might be argued that the "physical
considerations" do, in fact, do more to support RT than
BR. I am not concerned to debate this issue. I believe
that both philosophers and interested laymen have, if
only informally, allowed the argument from the physical
sciences to convince them that something like BR is true.
The argument has great popular persuasive power, and I
believe that a discussion of its merits is warranted
here
.
Mackie mentions one tempting criticism of the argu-
ment .
It is often suggested that the so-called
primary qualities are merely those in which
physicists are specially interested, perhaps
because they lend themselves more than
others to measurement and to use in mathe-
matically formulated theories, but that
those of us who have other interests need
not defer to such base mechanical prefer-
17ences
.
Mackie responds that this criticism misses the point,
and he is right. Those who might offer this criticism
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seem to forget that the objects of the physicist's
interest are not arbitrarily chosen, nor are they selec-
ted on the basis of ease of measurement or mathematical
handling. In fact, as I understand it, several entities
in which physicists are specially interested defy at-
tempts both to measure them and to fit them neatly into
mathematically formulated theories. Presumably, a
physicist becomes interested in an entity because he
finds he needs it to complete his description of a
particular phenomenon and loses interest in it when it
becomes apparent that the postulation of its existence
is superfluous to a complete description of any parti-
cular phenomenon. The point of the argument from the
physical sciences is not that philosophers should make
the concerns of the physicist their own just because they
are the concerns of the physicist, but rather that the
philosopher should attend to the ontology of the physi-
cist because he postulates and rejects entities for
philosophically interesting reasons.
The problem with arguing from the physical sciences
to BR is fundamental: it is not at all clear what it means
to say that the physical sciences are unconcerned with
the secondary qualities of objects. A careful look at the
argument will make this clearer. We might formulate that
part of the argument that deals with the secondary qualities
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in this way;
(1) For any property, F, such that the assumption
that a material object has F is irrelevant to
an adequate scientific hypothesis concerning
that object's behavior and interaction with
other objects, it may be assumed that the ob-ject lacks F.
(2) All of the secondary qualities are such that,
for any material object, x, the assumption that
X has any one of them is irrelevant to an ade-
quate scientific hypothesis concerning x's
behavior and interaction with other objects.
(3) It may be assumed that all material objects
lack all of the secondary qualities.
Premise (1) is an attempt to express the principle of
ontological economy that Mackie has in mind. I have
misgivings about its truth and its faithfulness to
whatever principle Mackie wishes to employ here, but I
am confident that if anything, it errs in being stronger
than it need be, and I am willing to grant it to any
proponent of this argument. The rest of the argument,
which is concerned with the primary qualities, might
proceed this way:
(4) For any property, F, if the assumption that
a material object has F is necessary to an
adequate scientific hypothesis concerning
that object's behavior and interaction with
other objects, it may be assumed that the
object has F.
(5) All of the determinable primary qualities are
such that for any material object, x, the
assumption that x has them is necessary to
an adequate hypothesis concerning x's be-
havior and interaction with other objects.
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(6) It may be assumed that all material objectshave all of the determinable primary qualities.^®
The controversial premise here is, of course, premise
(2) . In order to evaluate it, we need to have a theory
about the nature of secondary qualities. If the secondary
qualities are taken to be intrinsic physical features
of material objects, features like having a particular
level of mean molecular kinetic energy, then premise (2)
is patently false. Such properties do, of course, play
a role in scientific hypotheses about objects. If the
secondary qualities are taken to be dispositions of
objects to interact with other objects in certain ways,
properties such as being disposed to reflect light
waves of some frequency or other, then again, (2) is
clearly false. If, on the other hand, secondary qualities
are taken to be dispositions of objects to appear to
sentient creatures in particular ways, then (2) has some
plausibility. Suppose, then, we assume that secondary
qualities are dispositions to appear in certain ways,
decide on that basis that (2) is true and therefore
accept (3). We would be in the unenviable position of
holding that objects do not have dispositions to appear
in certain ways to sentient creatures. Since it is
undeniable that objects do have such dispositions, we
might be tempted to reject premise (1) of the argument.
It is far more certain that objects do in fact have
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dispositions to appear in particular ways to sentient
creatures than that (1) is true. I doubt that a pro-
ponent of the argument would want to offer this account
of secondary qualities.
There is a further view about the nature of secondary
*3^^iities on which (2) is clearly true. That, of course,
is the view that the secondary qualities are mental
phenomena or properties of mental phenomena. Obviously,
though, to analyze secondary qualities in this way is to
beg the question at hand.
The argument from the physical sciences, then,
cannot support BR. Those who use it and find it con-
vincing must be assuming part of what they want to
prove, that the secondary qualities are identifiable
with mental phenomena or features of those phenomena in
a way that the primary qualities are not. In concluding
his discussion of the argument, Mackie makes a telling
comment. He says.
But I have no doubt that most people who
use colour words are commonly inclined to
believe something . . . that may be indi-
cated by saying that colours as we see
them belong intrinsically to the (illumin-
ated) surfaces of material objects.
I am not sure what it means to say that colors as we
see them belong intrinsically to the illuminated surfaces
of material objects; perhaps it means that if we could
see objects as they really are, our perceptions of them
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unmediated by our sense apparatus, we would see that they
have colors. Or perhaps it means that God, who sees
the things themselves intimately, and thoroughly
perceives them . . ."20 3003 that objects have color.
But I hasten to add that, although I am uncertain about
the meaning of that claim, I am fairly sure that the
denial of BR does not entail that the claim is true.
The view that color is something laid over the surfaces
of objects may well be believed by most people, but I
doubt that it is believed by most philosophers who
reject BR, and it will not do to support BR by appealing
to the apparent falsity of this mystifying view.
We have discussed three kinds of arguments in favor
of BR, two of them straight from Locke's Essay and the
third a contemporary one in a traditional Lockean spirit.
The first compares secondary qualities with pains and
certain other mental phenomena. The second points out
that variations in secondary quality perceptions occur
even when the perceived object remains unchanged. The
third appeals to the work of physical scientists who
find certain hypotheses about secondary quality possession
by material objects superfluous to their concerns.
None of the three is successful in showing that there is
some compelling reason to believe that secondary qualities
exist only in the mind that is not also a reason to
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believe the same of primary qualities. Neither the
Lockean reasoning nor the more contemporary argument
provides us with good evidence that BR is true. We
turn, then, to RT.
The Resemblance Thesis
Locke's statement of the Resemblance Thesis is this:
The ideas of primary qualities of bodies
are resemblances of them, and their patterns
do really exist in the bodies themselves,
but the ideas produced in us by these
secondary qualities have no resemblance of
them at all. There is nothing like our
ideas, existing in the bodies themselves
.
Although Locke's statement of the Resemblance Thesis is
perhaps hopelessly obscure, both Berkeley and Reid think
they understand it, although they differ somewhat in
their interpretations of it.
Here is one of the passages in which Berkeley
attributes RT to Locke.
The ideas we have of these the secondary
qualities they acknowledge not to be the
resemblances of anything existing without
the mind, or unperceived, but they will
have our ideas of the primary qualities to
be patterns or images of things which
exist without the mind, in an unthinking
substance which they call "matter.
In arguing against RT, Berkeley employs his famous
Likeness Principle, that nothing can be like an idea
but another idea.
An idea can be like nothing but an idea;
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a colour or figure can be like nothing
but another colour or figure. If we lookbut never so little into our thoughts, we
shall find it impossible for us to con-
ceive a likeness except only between our
ideas.
Berkeley offers little or no support for the Likeness
Principle. He seems to think it is obviously true.
Hence, I think we should give the simplest possible
interpretation to the Likeness Principle and Berkeley's
reasons for holding it.^"^
The passage above suggests an argument for the Like-
ness Principle that is relatively simple, truly
Berkeleyan in spirit and unfortunately, invalid. The
hint lies in Berkeley's prediction that introspection
will reveal that it is "impossible for us to conceive
a likeness except only between our ideas." It is tempting
to read this statement as constituting an argument anal-
ogous to the "tree in the quad" argument in paragraph 23
of the Principles . If we can conceive of resemblance
only between ideas, then, if only what is conceivable is
possible, resemblance can obtain only between ideas.
We are now assured that nothing can be like an idea but
another idea, because nothing but ideas can resemble
anything. We can readily imagine a Berkeleyan defense of
the first premise of this argument: try to conceive of
a pair of resembling things, one member of which is not
an idea. Of course, we are unable to do this, and can
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grant Berkeley the first premise. This first premise,
however, together with the second premise, does not
entail the conclusion. To make the point clearer, we
should make the first premise more explicit.
(1) It is impossible that there is a pair of things,
X and y , at least one of which is not an idea,
such that we conceive that x resembles y.
The second premise might be expressed this way:
(2) Whatever is inconceivable is impossible.
It is clear that (1) and (2) together do not yield the
conclusion Berkeley wants. The premise which would,
with (2), yield the appropriate conclusion is (1*).
(1*) It is inconceivable that there is a pair of
things, x and y, at least one of which is not
an idea, such that x resembles y.
It is well known that when Berkeley uses the term
'conceive', he usually means something like 'form a
mental image'. If we take conception to be this sort
of mental act, then (1*) has some plausibility. However,
reading 'conceive' and hence, 'inconceivable', in the
Berkeleyan manner, it is doubtful that (2) is true. It
is not the case that only those things we can mentally
picture are possible; it is probable that no one can
picture a chiliagon, yet surely it is possible that such
things exist. If (2) is to seem plausible, conception
must be taken to be the act of considering or entertaining,
an act whose object is a proposition and which does , not
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necessarily involve any mental images. Yet if we think
of conception in this way, (1*) seems false. It seems,
for example, that even Berkeley might admit that we can
conceive (in the sense specified) that there are two
spirits which resemble one another, yet surely spirits
are not ideas.
One way to attempt to justify (1*) is to take
resemblance to be a matter of perceived similarity
between entities. Then to say that two things resemble
oris another is to say that they look alike or smell
alike or taste alike and so on. For Berkeley, then,
resemblance, in this sense, would be a relation that
could obtain only among ideas or sensations, since these
are the only entities we directly perceive. We could,
then, provide Berkeley with a defense of (1*) by sti-
pulating that two things can be said to resemble one
another only insofar as they can be directly perceived
to have similar features. Since only ideas can be
directly perceived, only ideas can bear resemblance to
anything
.
The obvious problem here is that we need to justify
restricting the resemblance relation to perceived simi-
larity. Without such a restriction on resemblance (1*)
remains unsupported. Since (1*) figures in an argument
for a conclusion stronger than the Likeness Principle, we
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can abandon (1*) without thereby admitting failure to
justify the Likeness Principle. If we cannot provide
an argument for the conclusion that only ideas can bear
resemblance relations, it may yet be possible to find
a good reason to say that ideas can resemble only one
another
.
The most obvious way to do this is to suppose, as
Berkeley does, that if an entity is sensible, it can
resemble only another sensible entity. Then, since
only ideas are sensible, it follows that an idea can
resemble nothing but another idea. This line of argu-
ment occurs more than once in the Principles and the
Dialogues . In one of Berkeley's earliest discussions
of RT in the Principles
, he says,
I appeal to anyone, whether it be sense
to assert a colour is like something which
is invisible, hard or soft, like something
which is intangible, and so of the rest.^^
Near the close of the first Dialogue, Philonous, having
extracted from Hylas the Lockean doctrine that our ideas,
unlike their archetypes or originals, are sensible, asks.
But how can that which is sensible be
like that which is insensible? Can a
real thing, in itself invisible
,
be like
a colour ; or a real thing, which is not
audible
,
be like a sound? In a word, can
anything be like a sensation or idea, but
another sensation or idea?^^
By Locke's own theory, all our perception of external
objects is mediated by sensa. Since external objects are
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not themselves sensible, they cannot resemble our ideas,
which are sensible entities.
Although I find this line of reasoning attractive,
I confess that I can find nothing in Berkeley to support
the principle that sensible things can resemble only
other sensible things. Nor can I devise a convincing
argument for this principle. Clearly, sensible things
can share many contingent properties with insensible
things, for example, existing in 1979
, having been pro-
duced by God, having been discussed by Locke and
Berkeley, and so forth. Since neither Locke nor
Berkeley considers such properties in defending or at-
tacking claims of idea-object resemblance, it is pro-
bable that their notion of reseiriblance involves something
more than mere property-sharing. Presumably/ it is
some special sort of property which must be shared if
two entities are to resemble one another. Berkeley
apparently believes that resemblance to sensible entities
requires possession of sensible properties. To support
this he might say that if a given entity, x, is sensible,
the way to find out if x is like some other entity, y,
is to sensibly experience both of them and then compare
the two objects. If the comparison is impossible due
to the insensibility of y, it would be nonsense to say
that X resembles y. But since it is possible to make
comparisons between any two entities without directly
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experiencing them, this argument is very weak.
Berkeley could make one last effort and point out
that in the context in which Locke discusses idea-object
resemblance, he is mainly concerned with sensory know-
ledge of material objects. One might deduce from this
that in determinations of resemblance between entities,
the relevant shared properties must be sensible proper-
ties. Since nothing but ideas has sensible properties,
all assertions of resemblance between ideas and insensible
items are false, at least in the context of discussing
knowledge gained through the senses. Although this
suggestion may have some merit, it seems quite a depar-
ture from anything Berkeley actually says. At this
point, it will be more profitable to turn to two other
Berkeleyan arguments against RT.
A brief comment in the Dialogues suggests a rather
persuasive argument against RT. Near the end of the
first dialogue Philonous asks Hylas,
. . . if you say it Can external thingj
resembles some one only of our ideas, how
shall we be able to distinguish the true
copy from all the false ones?27
Here Berkeley implies that although it may not be false
or meaningless to talk of resemblance between material
objects and ideas, we can in principle never know which
of our ideas are so related to objects and which are not.
To gain such knowledge would require direct inspection of
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material objects, which are, of course, inaccessible to
us. Berkeley is probably wrong if he means to suggest
that the only way to attain knowledge of material objects
is to inspect them directly. There are other ways we
might come to know the nature of material objects; we
might be able to reason to certain conclusions concerning
their properties, or God might reveal to us the true
nature of external objects. However, since God has failed
to provide us with public revelations on these matters,
we must rely on our powers of reason to discover what
material objects are really like. However, if the
Lockean theory of perception is correct, it is hard to
see how reason alone could convince us of the truth of
the Resemblance Thesis. Locke is not particularly
helpful here. Although he produces several arguments to
try to show that secondary quality ideas resemble
nothing in objects, he never offers any proof of his
contention that our primary quality ideas do resemble
qualities of physical objects. Berkeley's scepticism
on this point seems well-founded.
A third argument against RT occurs earlier in the
same speech from which the last quotation was taken.
Philonous is challenging Hylas
.
How then is it possible that things per-
petually fleeting and variable as our ideas
should be copies or images of anything
fixed and constant? Or, in other words.
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since all sensible qualities, as size,figure, colour, etc., that is, our ideas,
are continually changing, upon every al-teration in the distance, medium or in-
struments of sensation; how can any deter-
minate material objects be properly rep-
resented or painted forth by several distinctthings, each of which is so different from
and unlike the rest?^°
Berkeley seems to be pointing out that if, as Locke's
theory holds, there are material objects, they are
represented to us not by one constant idea or stable
set of Ideas, but rather by ideas and idea-complexes
which are fleeting and sometimes radically diverse from
one another. It is not altogether clear what Berkeley
is getting at here. Perhaps what he wants to prove is
that RT entails contradictions, that it is impossible
that all of our ideas of the primary qualities of any
object resemble all of the primary qualities of that
object. For example, at one time I may see a tabletop
as round, at another time elliptical. If both my ideas
of the shape of the table resemble the shape of the
table, then the table is both round and elliptical.
Since this is impossible, it is false that both of my
ideas of the shape of the table can resemble the shape
of the table. If this captures, as I believe it does,
the spirit of Berkeley's third attack on RT, then surely
Berkeley's argument misses the mark. RT does not entail
that when we perceive a physical object as having some
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determinate primary quality, the object in fact has that
determinate quality. All Locke need claim is that when
we perceive an object as having some determinate primary
quality, the object we perceive has in fact a property
that is a determinable of the determinate property it
appears to have. In other words, RT does not entail
that when I see a table as elliptical, the table that I
see is elliptical; presumably, it entails only that when
I see a table as elliptical, the table I see has shape.
Another possible way of interpreting the quotation
above is to attribute to Berkeley the view that ideas
cannot resemble external objects because ideas are vari-
able and fleeting while external objects are, as Philonous
puts it, of a "stable and permanent" nature. I con-
fess I do not see the force of this argument. I cannot
imagine on what grounds we might justify the assertion
that variable and fleeting entities cannot resemble
stable and permanent ones. This way of dealing with RT is
not at all promising.
In spite of Berkeley's failure to present a deci-
sive refutation of the Resemblance Thesis, he succeeds
in casting doubt on the meaningfulness of saying that
some of our ideas resemble external objects. Further,
he arouses suspicion as to the reasonableness of saying
that we can know that some of our ideas resemble exter-
nal objects and that some do not. Our conclusion at this
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point IS cautious, for Berkeley may have failed to fully
understand Locke's notion of resemblance.
In Essay II of his Essays on Intellectual Powers
of Man, Thomas Reid says these things about Locke's
P^iniary— secondary guality distinction:
The ideas we have of the various qualities
of bodies are not all, as Mr. Locke thinks,
of the same kind. Some of them are images
or resemblances of what is really in the
body; others are not. There are certain
qualities inseparable from matter, such as
extension, solidity, figure, mobility. Our
ideas of these are real resemblances of the
qualities in the body, and these he calls
primary qualities; but colour, sound, taste,
smell, heat and cold, he calls secondary
qualities, and thinks that they are only
powers in bodies of producing certain sen-
sations in us, which sensations have no-
thing resembling them, though they are
commonly thought to be exact resemblances
of something in the body.^^
I might mention several paradoxes, which
Mr. Locke, though by no means fond of
paradoxes, was led into by this theory of
ideas. Such as, that the secondary quali-
ties of body are no qualities of body at all,
but sensations of the mind: That the pri-
mary qualities of body are resemblances of
our sensations ...
We can see in these passages that Reid attributes both
BR and RT to Locke and that he considers both to be
"paradoxical." We should also note that Reid attributes
to Locke a view incompatible with BR, namely, the view
that secondary qualities are powers of bodies. (Since
Locke endorses each of these views we can sympathize
with Reid's confusion on this point.) In his discussions
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of Locke, Reid does not launch a direct attack on BR, but
he does devote much attention to RT. He uses Berkeley's
Likeness Principle in criticizing RT, but his reasons
for accepting the Likeness Principle are considerably
different from Berkeley's.
Reid's formulation of his criticism of RT differs
from Berkeley's in that he rejects the locution 'idea of
a quality' and substitutes 'sensation belonging to a
quality
, so what Locke and Berkeley would call the idea
of, say, warmth, Reid would call the sensation belonging
to or associated with the quality of warmth. Reid's
^^iticism of RT is inspired in part by his rejection of
Locke's representational theory of perception. While he
allows that our perception of secondary qualities is
mediated by sensations, he adopts a direct realist
account of primary quality perception. Consider these
quotations from Reid:
. . . our senses give us a direct and dis-
tinct notion of the primary qualities, and
inform^ us what they are in themselves . ^
^
. . . it is evident that our notion of pri-
mary qualities is not of this kind [relative]]
,
we know what they are, and not barely what
relation they bear to something else.^^
Reid adds that although we receive certain sensations
(pain, pressure, etc.) from primary qualities, we can dis-
tinguish between the sensation (what we feel) and the
quality (what we perceive). Reid argues that Locke was
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mistaken in his assertion of resemblance between primary
qualities and the sensations they produce.
. . . had Mr
. Locke attended with sufficient
accuracy to the sensations which he was
everyday and every hour receiving from pri-
mary qualities, he would have seen, that they
can as little resemble any quality of aninanimated being, as pain can resemble a
cube or a circle.
In support of this contention, Reid appeals to the Likeness
Principle
.
I have a clear and distinct notion of each
of the primary qualities. I have a clear
and distinct notion of sensation. I can
compare the one with the other; and when
I do so, I am not able to discern a resem-
bling feature. Sensation is the act, or
the feeling, I dispute not which, of a
sentient being. Figure, divisibility,
solidity are neither acts nor feelings.
Sensation supposes a sentient being as its
subject; for a sensation that is not felt
by some sentient being, is an absurdity.
Figure and divisibility suppose a subject
that is figured and divisible, but not a
subject that is sentient.
Note that while Berkeley's rejection of RT seems to rely
on the alleged impossibility of comparing the two sorts of
entities thought to resemble one another, Reid's re-
jection of RT stems from his belief that we can compare
them, and that when we do, we shall not discern any re-
semblance in our subjects.
Reid defines sensation in this way:
Sensation is a name given by philosophers
to an act of mind, which may be distin-
guished from all others by this, that it
hath no object distinct from the act itself.
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Reid s sensation" is different from a Lockean or
Berkeleyan idea. The main difference is that while Reid's
sensation is an objectless act, the idea of Locke and
is the object of some mental act. This variance
does not substantively affect Reid's criticisms of RT.
Reid's version of the Likeness Principle seems to be that
a sensation cannot be like a quality. It is difficult to
isolate from Reid's discussion the passages in which he
makes his case for the Likeness Principle. The best candi-
dates are these statements:
Sensation is the act ... of a sentient
being . . . Figure, divisibility, soli-
dity are neither acts nor feelings,
and
Sensation supposes a sentient being as its
subject; . . . Figure and divisibility
suppose a subject that is figure and di-
visible, but not a subject that is sen-
tient.
I think we can admit that Reid points to some genuine
differences between sensations and qualities, but nothing
here is sufficient to show that there can be no resem-
blance of any kind between a sensation and a quality.
Perhaps Reid intends to make the claim that since
sensations are essentially experienced entities, a
sensation can be said to resemble another entity only if
they are experienced to be the same. Qualities are not
experienced; rather they produce sensations which are
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experienced. So qualities and sensations cannot be said
to resemble one another. it is unlikely, however, that
this is Reid's argument, for his direct realist account
of primary quality perception implies that some qualities
can be experienced directly.
Another, more likely, possibility is that Reid means
to say simply and boldly that no purely mental phenomenon
assemble a non-mental phenomenon. If this claim were
true, then there would be no justification for saying that
any idea or sensation resembles any quality of a purely
material object. Indeed, in at least two places, Reid in-
dicates that to postulate resemblance between our sensa-
tions and the qualities of a material object would be
tantamount to attributing the power of sensation to that
object. He says.
The philosopher says, there is no heat in
the fire, meaning, that the fire has not
the sensation of heat . . . They [the vul-
gar3 know as well as the philosopher, that
the fire does not feel heat; and this is
all he means by saying there is no heat in
the fire.^^
Earlier he had said, in discussing the smell of a rose.
But there can be nothing like to this sen-
sation in the rose, because it is insen-
tient.
To say then that an idea or sensation of solidity resem-
bles the quality solidity in an object would imply that
the object itself has this idea or sensation. Since the
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object does not, it must be false that an idea of solidity
can resemble the solidity of an object. Unfortunately,
Reid derives this conclusion from a very controversial
premise, that sensations can resemble only sensations and
perhaps, other mental phenomena. Therefore, I think that
Reid fails in his attempt to provide a priori justifica-
tion of his rejection of rt
.
He is more successful when
he turns to the empirical data available to us.
Reid argues that Locke's claim that ideas of primary
qualities resemble those qualities is contradicted by
experience and reason, and he accuses Locke of having
failed to devote sufficient attention to his own sensa-
tions and ideas to avoid his error. Reid offers an
example
.
Let a man press his hand against a hard
body
,
and let him attend to the sensa-
tion he feels, excluding from his thought
every thing external, even the body that is
the cause of his feeling. This abstraction
indeed is difficult, and seems to have been
little, if at all, practised: but it is not
impossible, and it is evidently the only
way to understand the nature of the sensa-
tion. A due attention to this sensation
will satisfy him, that it is no more like
hardness in a body, than the sensation of
sound is like vibration in the sounding
body
.
Reid explains,
I know of no ideas but my conceptions, and
my idea of hardness in a body, is the con-
ception of such a cohesion of its parts as
requires great force to displace them. I
have both the conception and belief of this
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quality in the body, at the same time that
I have the sensation of pain, by pressing
my hand against it. The sensation and per-
ception are closely conjoined by my consti-
t^tion, but I am sure they have no simili-
tude: I know no reason why the one should
be called the idea of the other, which does
not lead us to call every natural effect
the idea of its cause.
Reid is quite convincing here; his assertion that the
sensation produced in us by touching a hard (or solid)
object does not resemble the quality of hardness or so-
lidity as we conceive of or understand it is, I think,
true. We can manufacture many other examples of complete
dissimilarity between our sensations of primary qualities
and those qualities as we conceive them to be. Consider
the sensations produced in us by a moving body. They
can range from a blurred image of the moving object to
a sensation of pressure or even nausea if we ourselves
happen to be on or in the moving object. These ideas or
sensations, far from resembling the phenomenon of change
of location, are so unlike motion that we can hardly find
a basis on which to compare them. Consider the feeling
associated with lifting a heavy object, the pain in one's
arms, the downward tug one feels. What have these sensa-
tions to do with the phenomena of mass and gravity? The
pencil I am holding has a point at one end; how could the
sensation I receive when I press that point to my finger
be like the molecular arrangement of the graphite which
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accounts for its pointedness? We associate touching a
spherical object with a certain feeling of movement in
our arms or the muscle tension involved in cupping our
hands. These sensations are nothing like what it is for
an object to be spherical. We experience size and shape
visually by seeing a two-dimensional pattern of color and
shadow, and this experience has very little of interest
in common with what it is to have a number of molecules
arranged in a particular way.
Reid gives us a rather simple and intuitive under-
standing of Locke's contention that some of our sensations
"resemble" some of the properties of material objects:
roughly, to say that a sensation or idea resembles the
property which produces it is to say, in general, that
the idea we have of the property is like what it is to
have that property. Reid does not explicate for us his
concept of the relation like
,
but he really does not
need to do this. A careful attention to our sensations
informs us that they are none of them in any way like
,
on any interpretation, either the primary or the secon-
dary qualities. The most telling fact about this pro-
ject is that when we try to compare our sensations with
properties, we can neither find a common ground on which
to judge them nor imagine what form a resemblance between
them might take.
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Although Reid rejects RT, he believes, as we have
noted, that a distinction can be made between the primary
and secondary qualities. Although Reid's distinction is
based on a direct realist account of primary quality per-
ception that Locke rejects, it deserves brief consideration
in this context. Reid asks.
Is there a just foundation for this dis-
tinction? Is there any thing common to
the primary which belongs not to the se-
condary? And what is it?
I answer, that there appears to me
to be a real foundation for the distinc-
tion; and it is this: that our senses
give us a direct and distinct notion of
the primary qualities, and inform us
what they are in themselves but of the
secondary qualities, our senses give us
only a relative and obscure notion.
They inform us only, that there are qua-
lities that affect us in a certain manner,
that is, produce in us a certain sensation;
but as to what they are in themselves,
our senses leave us in the dark.^^
Although not itself a version of RT, the primary-secondary
quality distinction suggested by this passage is worth
discussing in conjuntion with RT. The passage suggests
that ordinary perception, unabetted by special instru-
ments or sophisticated scientific theory, enables us to
make accurate inferences about the nature of the primary
qualities while it fails to enable us to make accurate
inferences about the nature of the secondary qualities.
For example, seeing and feeling sizes and shapes causes
us to reason correctly about these sizes and shapes. On
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the other hand, color perception suggests to us that color
is something spread over the surfaces of objects while in
fact being colored involves reflecting light of certain
wavelengths
.
Even if we ignore the puzzle of how we could, employ-
ing a Lockean theory of perception, justify our claims to
understand the true nature of the primary and secondary
qualities of external objects, this version of RT is un-
promising for two reasons. One, in some cases, ordinary
perception alone is not sufficient to enable us to reach
a full or accurate understanding of the nature of the
primary qualities. It may be true that our senses inform
us what shape and size are, but ordinary perception
does not provide us with even a piece of the theory of
mutual attraction of bodies which accounts for the phe-
nomenon of weight or the nature of that repulsion be-
tween entities which accounts for solidity. Indeed, our
senses are quite misleading with regard to the primary
qualities. We perceive many objects as being continuous
chunks of inactive stuff; we know now that this picture
is inaccurate. Second, in at least one case, ordinary
experience allows us to make fairly accurate inferences
about the nature of secondary qualities. Episodes of
smelling incline us to believe that something leaves the
object and wafts through the air toward us, and this is.
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in fact, what is happening when we smell objects.
J.L. Mackie, in defending his version of Locke's
primary-secondary quality distinction, employs both the
notion of resemblance that Reid dealt with and something
like the idea discussed above. When Locke states the
Resemblance Thesis, Mackie says, he
means, surely, that material things literally
have shapes as we see shapes, feel shapes,
and think of shapes, that things move injust the sort of way in which we see, feel,
and think of things moving, and so on. But
he cannot mean that we never make mistakes
. . . Essentially what he must be claiming
is that material things have, for example,
shapes which are determinations of the same
determinable or category, shape in general,
as are the shapes seen, felt, or thought
of . . . colours as we see them are totally
different not only from the powers to pro-
duce such sensations, with which Locke e-
quates the secondary qualities, but also
from the ground or basis of these powers in
the things we call coloured. This ground,
Locke thinks, will be only some arrange-
ment and motion of the minute parts of
surfaces of these things: no colour as we
see colour, no determinate within that ca-
tegory at all, is literally in or on the
things. . .
Mackie tries to compress some pretty murky notions into
the phrase "shapes as we see shapes, feel shapes, and
think of shapes." He may be referring to the sensations
we receive when we perceive shapes visually or tactually,
or perhaps he is referring just to the concept of shape,
the way we "think of" shapes. If he is doing either, the
considerations discussed above are sufficient to show he
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IS mistaken in his claim that some special relationship
exists between the primary qualities and their ideas
that does not also obtain between at least some of the
secondary qualities and their ideas. Although it is very
difficult to know what various philosophers have in
mind when they talk about primary quality-primary
quality idea resemblance, it is hard to see how, using
any notion of resemblance, ideas of, say, solidity
can resemble solidity while ideas of hardness and soft-
ness do not resemble those qualities.
Mackie says nothing enlightening. He seems to have
only the vaguest concept of quality-idea resemblance.
He is convinced that our color experiences are unlike
any properties of physical objects, but he seems to for-
get that many of our experiences of shape are just a com-
plex of color experience plus sensations of pressure.
I fail to see how the latter experience can resemble any
property of objects if the former cannot.
From Reid and Mackie we have culled two possible
interpretations of RT. Both seem implausible, so if we
are to find an attractive version of RT, we should look
elsewhere
.
We have yet to discuss in this context Locke's own
arguments for RT. They occur at II , viii , 16-20 of the
Essay . They concern the warmth of fire, the whiteness and
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sweetness of manna and the colors of porphyry. As I sta-
ted earlier, they are all, in part, attempts to show that
secondary qualities exist only while they are being per-
ceived. For Locke, it is a short step from this posi-
tion, BR, to RT. Secondary qualities are like pain,
ideas produced in us by physical objects. The pain pro-
duced by a physical object is not a quality of that ob-
ject, nor, presumably, does it resemble any quality of that
object. For example, a pointed object coming in contact
flesh can cause pain, but the pain in no way resem-
bles its cause. By analogy, then, secondary qualities do
not resemble their causes. It is clear that part of
Locke's support for RT is BR.
We can reconstruct Locke's reasoning here in a way
which suggests a new version of RT. Since according to
BR objects possess no secondary qualities, secondary
quality ideas are caused by the primary qualities. Pri-
mary quality ideas are also caused by the primary qualities.
Primary quality ideas, then, differ from the secondary
quality ideas with respect to the relation they bear to
their causes. The cause of an idea of, say, squareness is
the particular squareness of a physical object, while the
cause of an idea of redness is not the particular redness
of a physical object, but rather some or all of its pri-
mary qualities. Secondary quality ideas are like pain in
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that the cause of pain is not pain in the object, and the
cause of a secondary quality idea is not a corresponding
quality in the object. Locke is here making a primary-
secondary quality idea distinction, rather than a dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities.
It would be difficult to formulate precisely Locke's
conclusion here. Resemblance seems to be a matter of a
kind of correspondence between ideas and their causes;
primary quality ideas have it with their causes and
secondary quality ideas lack it. There is no need to
this because the reasoning behind it is defec-
tive. Since Locke offers no convincing arguments for BR,
the first and most crucial premise of the argument for
this view is unsupported.
In our examination of various views on primary
quality-idea resemblance, we have found no precise state-
ment about the nature of such resemblance, while we have
found good reason to think RT must be false, either be-
cause resemblance is explicated in such a way as to make
it apparent that primary quality ideas cannot resemble
their causes or because resemblance is explicated in such
a way as to suggest that some secondary quality ideas
must resemble their causes. Perhaps the best way to
treat RT as we have seen it presented so far is not to
stress its apparent falsity but rather to complain that it
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is insufficiently precise to evaluate, to suggest that
RT borders on incomprehensibility. To close the chapter,
I wish to deal with a contemporary theory that is clear
enough to be dealt with confidently.
BR and RT Combined
Recently, Keith Campbell"^^ has made a thorough-
going attempt at a primary-secondary quality distinction
that is spiritually akin to Locke
' s Resemblance Thesis
and also involves an objective-subjective quality distinc-
tion. Campbell begins his discussion with a fairly
typical expression of the alleged difference between
primary and secondary qualities.
The idea at work in distinguishing primary
from secondary qualities is the idea that
some qualities are objective, and belong
to the natures of things, while others
are subjective, that is, enter experience
only because of the character of the ex-
periencer
.
Campbell continues,
. . . it is not possible to analyze what
it is for an object to have a secondary
quality without referring to how it seems
to some observer, and in this sense, ob-
jects would not have secondary qualities
if there were no perceivers
.
For Campbell, the objectivity of primary qualities con-
sists in the fact that we can analyze what it is for an
object to have a particular primary quality without re-
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ferring to how it appears to any observer, by referring
solely to its behavior patterns. Bearers of primary
qualities display distinctive patterns of interaction
with other bodies.
For ex^ple, cubes don't just look and
feel different from spheres. The behavior
of cubes on inclined planes and sets of
steps is different. There are differ-
ences in the bouncing behavior, the
stacking behavior, results of rotation,
in whether they pass through holes of
various shapes, in how much paint is
needed to cover them, and so forth in-
definitely .
Campbell suggests:
(Cl) Quality Q is primary if and only if all and
only those objects which have Q display a
distinctive pattern of behavior in inter-
action with the inanimate environment
.
For ease of reference we might call the distinctive
pattern of behavior that objects which have Q display
in interaction with the inanimate environment Q-distinc-
tive behavior and amend Campbell's criterion to:
(C2) Quality Q is primary iff there is a Q-distinctive
pattern of behavior in interaction with
the inanimate environment which all and
only objects which have Q display.
Campbell does not offer us an analogous criterion for
deciding which qualities are secondary. The most rea-
sonable possibility is:
(C3) Quality Q is secondary iff there is no Q-distinc-
tive pattern of behavior in interaction
with the inanimate environment which all
and only objects which have Q display.
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CdmpbGll doGS not go so far as to say that thG SGcondary
qualitiGS arG itiGrG idGas. RathGr thG subjGctivity of
SGcondary qualitios is supposGd to consist in thoir
obsGrvGr-dGpGndGncG
.
HowGVGr, (C2) and (C3) do not SGrvG to distinguish
primary from SGCondary qualitios: possGssion of SGcon-
dary qualities by physical objects does indeed corre-
late with their behavior, and if objectivity is a matter
of distinctive behavior alone, then secondary qualities
are as objective as the primary. Bennett points out that
brown apples are usually more squashable
than green ones, blue flames boil water
faster than yellow ones, a red surface re-
flects lightwaves of different lengths from
those reflected by a blue surface, and so
on.
In fact, we can correlate every secondary quality of
material objects with some sort of behavior pattern: red
objects reflect light of certain wavelengths; bitter
things have such and such concentrations of certain sub-
stances; hot objects have a certain degree of molecular
energy; soft things have a certain distribution of par-
ticles; fragrant things emit certain sorts of micro-
scopic entities, etc.
Someone might object that, say, not everything that
looks red exhibits red-distinctive behavior. For example,
a white object and a pink object may both look red under
a red light, but when they are brought into the sunlight
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they behave in distinct ways. The objection fails inas-
much as we are entitled to distinguish real from apparent
colors, tastes, and the like. Just as not all things
that look spherical are spherical, not all things that
look red are red. Not everything that looks spherical
exhibits sphere-distinctive behavior; only things which
are spherical exhibit sphere-distinctive behavior.
Things that are red--i.e., behave in a particular way in
sunlight—behave in ways similar to one another under
all sorts of observation conditions. We can set standards
for determining when an object is red; we can devise tests
for redness that do not rely on popular reports. These
tests would be complicated and technical, but no more so
than a test to determine true sphericity.
Campbell, too, finds fault with his distinction. He
says
,
Objects which we see as different in colour
clearly have different effects on us . . .
we must suppose that to different perceived
qualities correspond different effects pro-
duced in the brain by the objects perceived
. . . these different effects in the brain
are produced in accordance with the laws go-
verning inanimate nature . . . every quali-
ty is, in consequence, primary.
In other words, given that perception of colors, tastes,
sounds, smells, textures, etc., involves brain activity,
it happens that all the so-called secondary qualities are
such that their bearers display various distinctive beha-
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vior patterns and are therefore primary qualities.
Campbell thinks a remnant of a distinction can be
salvaged by distinguishing perceived qualities from their
objective correlates, those features of
objects in virtue of which they give rise
to perceptions of one or another quality.
He says that for any perceived quality, its objective
correlate is a primary quality.
But the primacy of every objective corre-
late does not of itself ensure that every
perceived quality is a primary . . . Lea-
ving illusions aside, the objective corre-
late of perceived solidity is solidity.
The objective correlate of perceived
sphericity is sphericity, and likewise for
position, distance, or relative motion.
But the objective correlate of perceived
warmth is mean molecular energy.
We can express Campbell's intuition with two criteria.
(C4) Perceived quality Q is primary iff the objective
correlate of Q is Q.
(C5) Perceived quality Q is secondary iff the objective
correlate of Q is distinct from Q.
This contemporary version of Locke's resemblance
criterion, like its predecessor, fails to distinguish
among qualities of physical objects and distinguishes
instead among perceived qualities. We can, using (C4j
and (C5) as models, devise criteria for distinguishing
among qualities of physical objects. We can introduce
the notion of a subjective correlate of an objective
quality; our subjective correlates will be what Campbell
calls perceived qualities. Consider:
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(C6) Quality Q is primary iff the subjective correlate
of Q is Q.
Quality Q is secondary iff the subjective corre-
late of Q is distinct from Q.
(C6) requires a slight restriction. If, as we should,
we distinguish between real and apparent qualities, the
following problem arises. We know that objects often
present delusive appearances. For example, round things
look elliptical when viewed from certain angles.
Campbell tells us that the objective correlate of a
perceived quality is that feature of an object in virtue
of which it gives rise to the perception of the perceived
quality. It seems, then, that in the case of a round thing
appearing elliptical, ellipticality is the subjective
correlate of roundness. Since roundness is distinct from
ellipticality, (C6) yields the unfortunate result that
roundness is a primary quality when producing veridical
appearances and a secondary quality when producing de-
lusive appearances. This problem can be solved by res-
tricting the range of 'Q' in (C6) to determinable qua-
lities .
The results yielded by the restricted (C6) vary
depending on which views of property identity one adopts.
If one adopts the scientific realist view that all the
traditional secondary qualities are identical with in-
trinsic physical features of objects--e.g . , one identi-
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fies warmth with mean molecular kinetic energy— then
(C6) legislates that all qualities, subjective and ob-
jective, are primary and thereby fails to make any sort
of primary-secondary quality distinction. If, on the
other hand, one adopts a view which distinguishes some
secondary qualities from any collection of intrinsic
physical features of objects—e.g., one distinguishes
warmth from mean molecular energy-- (C6) yields the result
that having some level or other of mean molecular kinetic
energy is secondary, since it is distinct from its sub-
jective correlate. This result is incompatible with
Campbell's objective-subjective distinction, for surely
we can analyze what it is for a thing to have some level
or other of mean molecular kinetic energy without making
reference to perceivers. Since the need for such a refer-
ence is, for Campbell, the mark of the secondary qualities,
having some level or other of mean molecular kinetic
energy cannot be a secondary quality.
Campbell, who recognizes the failure of his effort,
concludes that we have two alternatives: like D.M.
Armstrong^^ we can identify the traditional secondaries
with some collection of qualities we call primary--e . g .
,
warmth with mean molecular kinetic enerqy--and thereby
deny that there is any distinction among qualities, or
we can readmit as secondaries such qualities
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as felt warmth and sound as heard.
The second alternative, favored by Campbell, is as much
an abandonment of a primary-secondary quality distinction
as the first. It has the further defect that there is no
justification for it.
Concluding Remarks
We have seen that in one section of the Essay
,
Locke
seems to suggest that BR and RT together will serve to
distinguish primary from secondary qualities. Locke's
attempt fails, and by using Campbell's resurrection of
the attempt as an example, I have tried to show that any
enterprise along these lines is doomed. Indeed, it is not
surprising to find that when we combine two defective
theories we fail to produce one adequate theory.
All versions of BR must fail because ultimately they
amount to either the simple claim that all qualities are
primary, an abandonment of a quality distinction, or the
unjustifiable singling out of a small group of perceived
qualities and dubbing these "secondary qualities" on
account of features they share with most, if not all, per-
ceived qualities. Attempts at RT fail largely due to
unclarity. When we try to resolve their unclarity,
they seem to fall into three groups: views about perceived
similarity between qualities and sensa; views about
106
quality-concept similarity; and views about quality-
sharing between objects and sensa. I have suggested
that none of these three views is successful. Berkeley's
arguments are victorious over the first; Reid's arguments
defeat the second; and the third is unjustifiable insofar
as it must rely on BR, itself a failure.
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CHAPTER I V
At II, viii, 19-20, Locke offers an argument v/hich
suggests that one way to distinguish primary from secondary
qualities is by consideration of the conditions under which
an object can gain or lose a particular sort of quality.
The argument implies that a crucial difference between pri-
mary and secondary qualities is that an object cannot lose
or gain a primary quality without undergoing some sort of
physical change or alteration, v/hile objects can (and often
do) gain and lose secondary qualities without any accompany-
ing physical alteration. Although Locke does not rely
heavily on this version of a primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction, it is, I think, initially appealing and merits
brief consideration.
The vagueness of the notion of a physical alteration
makes it difficult to evaluate this view. Nevertheless, I
intend to show that on a plausible interpretation of the
expression 'physical alteration,' this position considered
alone fails to distinguish among the qualities which physi-
cal objects possess.
The argument in which Locke hints that primary and
secondary qualities differ with regard to alterability
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concerns the colors of porphyry. I suggested a formulation
of the porphyry argument in Chapter I. Here is an amended
version, free of extraneous considerations.
(1) When the light is shut off, the color of theporphyry vanishes.
(2) When the light is shut off, no alteration is
made in the porphyry.
(3) If, when the light is shut off, the color of
the porphyry vanishes and no alteration is madein the porphyry, then the porphyry's loss of
color does not require an alteration of the
porphyry.
(4) The porphyry's loss of color does not require an
alteration of the porphyry.
Presumably, this argument can be generalized to show that
for any object and any secondary quality of that object, the
object s loss of the secondary quality does not require an
alteration of the object.
Jonathan Bennett^ discusses a possible situation in
which, because of a change in the human tasting mechanism,
a substance changes from bitter to tasteless, i.e., it loses
one of its secondary qualities without having undergone any
physical change. Robert Cummins, in a recent article, as-
serts that if everyone were blind, nothing would be blue;
more generally, if everyone suddenly lost his sight, all
objects would lose one of their secondary qualities, namely,
being colored.
In the situations described by Locke, Bennett and
Cummins, an object, without having changed physically, loses
Ill
one of its determinable secondary qualities. in other, per-
haps more familiar discussions of secondary qualities, we
are told that objects can lose determinate secondary quali-
ties without undergoing a physical change. That wine is
bitter to a sick man, that objects change color under dif-
ferent lights, that train whistles change pitch—all of
these are supposed to be examples of how an object can lose
a determinate secondary quality solely because of a change
in the environment or in the condition of the percipient.
In contrast to the secondaries, it is sometimes
thought, determinate primary qualities cannot be lost solely
because of a change in the environment or in the condition
of the observer. For example, even if everyone were to lose
the senses of sight and touch, there would still be objects
which are square, round, etc. Similarly, no mere change in
the environment would result in an object's changing its
size or mass. To make these changes, say these intuitions,
we must make a physical change in the object.
These intuitions suggest this version of a primary-
secondary quality distinction;
(A) Quality Q is primary iff (x) (x is a body and
X loses Q at t Z? X undergoes a physical al-
teration at t)
Quality Q is secondary iff <^(Ex) (x is a body
and X loses Q at t and x^oes not undergo a
physical alteration at t)
We can allow Q to range over both determinable and determin-
ate qualities; however, it is doubtful that objects can ever
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lose any of their determinable primary qualities. The view
that they cannot is the view that primary qualities are some-
how essential to bodies and is discussed fully in Chapter II.
The one restriction we need make is to limit the range of Q
to contingent qualities, as defined in Chapter II. ^ This is
to avoid the unhappy result that all necessary properties of
bodies are primary.
Some clarification of the notion of a physical alter-
ation is necessary. Obviously, v;e cannot define a physical
alteration as a quality change, for then we would beg the
question against proponents of the view under consideration.
If we take a physical object to be a collection of molecules
of a certain chemical composition in a particular arrange-
ment, we can sketch a criterion of physical alteration.
(PA) A body, x, undergoes a physical alteration iff
either (i) the number of molecules which consti-
tute X increases or decreases
or (ii) one or more of the molecules v;hich
constitute x changes in chemical com-
position.
or (iii) one or more of the molecules which
constitute x changes its position
relative to the others
or (iv) some force is exerted upon x.
Although (PA) is only a rough and inexact account of the
phenomenon of physical alteration, we can see that deter-
minate primary quality changes do require that something
like what is described by (i)-(iv) occur. A change in shape
usually requires (i) or (iii)
,
as does a change of size. A
change of mass requires (i) or (iv)
.
A change in degree of
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solidity requires (ii) or (iii). change in determinate mo-
tion requires (iv)
. Some primary quality changes can be
effected by (li) alone. It appears that the first part of
(A) expresses a truth.
The second part of (A)
,
which says that a body may
gain or lose a secondary quality without undergoing a physi-
cal alteration, is supported by arguments similar to Locke's
prophyry argument. Premise (2) of the porphyry argument is
supported by our rough analysis of physical alteration.
When the light that was shining on the porphyry is shut off,
none of the four conditions of (PA) need be met. The por-
phyry need not gain or lose molecules or change in chemical
composition; its molecules need not be rearranged, nor need
there be any force exerted on the porphyry. The shutting
off of the light does not cause any of these events, and
although any one of them may occur, they all may fail to
occur when the light is shut off.
The support for premise (1) is more elusive than
that for premise (2). On the Berkeley-Reid interpretation
of Locke's distinction, which holds that secondary qualities
are mere sensa, (1) is justified by the fact that the red
and white sensa produced by the porphyry disappear when the
light is shut off. But, as I tried to show in Chapter III,
there is no compelling reason to identify secondary quali-
ties with sensa or qualities of sensa which is not also a
reason for identifying primary qualities with sensa. In
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that case, if premise (1) of the porphyry argument is true,
then analogous statements about primary quality changes are
true as well (e.g.
,
as I walk away from the table, its shape
changes)
. From this we could generate arguments which con-
clude that primary quality changes in objects do not require
physical alterations, thus blurring the distinction we are
trying to make. Worse, on a dispositional analysis of
secondary qualities, premise (1) of the porphyry is false.
^
On a theory which holds that secondary qualities are
^®ither sensa nor dispositions but simply garden—variety
properties, the support for premise (1) of the porphyry
argument seems to be that after the lights are shut off, a
perceiver would no longer see any colors when he looked at
the porphyry. It appears to a percipient that the porphyry
has lost its colors or changed color from red and white to
black. From this we are to conclude that the porphyry has
lost or changed its colors. In effect, the holders of (A)
ask us to abandon, to some degree or other, the appearance-
reality dichotomy in the case of secondary qualities while
maintaining it in the case of the primaries. But they can
give us no reason to do so without appealing to some other
version of the primary-secondary quality distinction. With-
in the confines of the present view, we can give no reply to
the objector who says, "When the lights are shut off, the
porphyry is still red and white, just as grass is green at
night.
"
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To be fair here, we must distinguish two interpreta-
tions of
(a) Objects have just those secondary qualities thatthey appear to have.
One natural reading is
(a') ^ object has a particular secondary quality justin case someone perceives the object as having
that quality.
If a person sees a cube as blue (that is, the cube appears
to that person the way blue things normally appear in sun-
light)
,
then the cube is blue. This view has familiar
problems; it entails that objects can have contradictory
properties, a result which is tolerable if we identify
properties with the ways in which things appear but repel-
lant if we are speaking, as we are, of garden-variety
properties. No one who did not already believe that secon-
dary qualities are in some sense subjective would be tempted
to assert (a') and it can be rejected without regret in
favor of another reading of (a)
.
(a'') An object has a particular secondary quality
just in case most normal percipients perceive
it as having that quality.
On (a'')/ a white object under a red light is really red,
since normal percipients see it as such, while one or two
aberrant percipients' perceiving an object as red is not a
sufficient condition of its being red. This second view
does, in a way, distinguish between real and apparent secon-
dary qualities, and it supports premise (1) of the porphyry
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argument. (a'') can be contrasted with a third position,
antithetical to (a)
.
(b) An object has a particular secondary qualityjust in case normal percipients, under standard
observation conditions, perceive it as having
that quality.
(b) entails that a white object appearing red under a red
light is not red inasmuch as it does not appear red under
standard observation conditions. If vie accept (b)
,
we must
say that objects cannot lose their real secondary qualities
undergoing a physical alteration. Changes of color
require painting, dyeing or bleaching, changes of taste in-
volve chemical changes in the constituent molecules of the
tasted substances or the addition of new substances, and so
forth. We cannot change the secondary qualities of a body
merely by changing the environment or the conditions of the
perceiver; to do that v/ould be to do no more than change the
apparent secondary qualities of the object. Thus if we ac-
cept (b) we must reject (A)
.
In order to evaluate (A) we must have made up our
minds whether to accept (a'') or (b)
.
I can think of no
good reason to accept (a'') which does not either constitute
or rely upon some argument for the subjectivity of secondary
qualities. Presumably, then, if we accept (a’’) and (A), it
is because we believe that secondary qualities are in some
way subjective or mind-dependent while primary qualities are
in some way objective and mind-independent. But in that
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case, we will have already formulated a primary-secondary
quality distinction to which the present view is not central
Thus, this attempt at a primary-secondary quality
distinction is inadequate to distinguish between primary and
secondary qualities. At best, it is entailed by some cor-
rect formulation of the primary-secondary quality distinc-
tion, but It is unhelpful by itself. Without theoretical
backing it is merely controversial and provides its adher-
ents with no replies to their critics.
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CHAPTER V
In this chapter, I wish to consider a set of at-
tempts to draw a primary-secondary quality distinction which
have one feature in common: they all say that the secondary
qualities of material objects are dispositions of objects to
behave in certain ways under certain circumstances. In addi-
tion, it is part of all but one of the views I consider that
the primary qualities of objects are non-dispositional
. The
remaining view, the last I will discuss, takes primary
qualities to be dispositions, but of a different sort from
the dispositions that are secondary qualities. I am not par-
ticularly concerned with these positions as interpretations
of Locke, but rather as contemporary attempts to solve the
perennial problem of how to distinguish between primary and
secondary qualities. I will argue that none of the formula-
tions I discuss is a successful version of a primary-
secondary quality distinction. In addition, I discuss some
minor, but often overlooked, consequences of adopting the
position that secondary qualities are dispositions.
Although the list of Lockean secondary qualities is
restricted to color, smell, taste, sound "and other the like
sensible qualities,"^ at least one of the philosophers I dis-
cuss expands the list to include qualities like agreeable-
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ness and depressiveness. in the main, however, I shall be
concerned with the traditional secondary qualities: color,
smell, taste, sound and the various tactual qualities, heat
and cold, smoothness, and the like.
I
A few of the usual quotations from Locke will serve
as an introduction to the view that secondary qualities are
mere dispositions. At II, viii, 10 of his Essay
,
Locke says.
Secondly
,
such qualities which in truth are nothing
the objects themselves but powers to produce
various sensations in us by their primary qualities,
i.e., by the bulk, figure, texture, and motions of
their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes,
etc. These I call secondary qualities.
Later we read:
a violet, by the impulse of such insensible par-
ticles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks,
and of different degrees and modifications of their
motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour, and
sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our
minds. (II, viii, 13)
And later:
Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes
see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds;
let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and
all colours, tastes, odours, and sound, as they are
such particular ideas
,
vanish and cease, and are
reduced to their causes, i.e., bulk, figure, and
motion of parts. (II/ viii, 17)
These three quotations express three points, some or all of
which are made by each of the philosophers I discuss: (1)
secondary qualities are powers of objects to produce sensa-
tions in humans; (2) secondary qualities depend in some way
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on primary qualities; and (3) secondary qualities are dis-
positional in nature, the various dispositions being exer-
cised at various times depending on external conditions and
the state of the observer.
In the preface of his book Locke, Berkeley, Hume
.
Jonathan Bennett makes it clear that his concerns are only
secondarily historical.^ In his discussion of primary and
secondary qualities, Bennett takes himself to be proposing
a sound distinction between the two sorts of quality.
Bennett briefly discusses the view that primary
qualities are essential to bodies and that secondary quali-
ties are inessential to them. He thinks this theory is
"safe enough." Although he finds no obvious faults with
this account, he goes on to consider in a much more serious
way what he calls the Analytic Thesis.
Bennett begins by wondering what it means to sav
that a thing has a certain power to produce a certain sensa-
tion in a human. He decides that by 'x is green' all that
is meant is that if a human being were related to x in a
certain way then x would affect that person 'greenly.' He
concludes that "any statement attributing a secondary qual-
ity to a thing is equivalent to a counter factual of the form
If X stood in relation R to a normal human, the
human would have a sensory idea of such and such
a kind.
Presumably, what Bennett means by all this is that every
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proposition that attributes a secondary quality to an object
IS equivalent to some proposition which asserts that under
certain conditions, a normal human percipient of the object
will have sensory experiences of a particular kind.
Bennett's language here is misleading because it
seems to imply that for each proposition attributing a
secondary quality to an object there is just one counter-
factual that is strictly equivalent to it. What Bennett
should say is that each proposition attributing a secondary
quality to an object is strictly equivalent to any one of a
large set of propositions, each one of which mentions pos-
ol^servation conditions and then predicts that a normal
human percipient of the object under those conditions will
have a sensory experience of such and such a kind. As an
example, consider the proposition that the walls of m.y
office are white. It v/ould be equivalent to the proposition
that a normal human percipient who sees the walls of my
office under fluorescent lights will have a visual experi-
ence of white. Also, it would be equivalent to the proposi-
tion that a normal human percipient wearing violet-tinted
contact lenses who sees the walls of my office under fluor-
escent lighting will have a visual experience of pale violet.
If the Analytic Thesis is correct, there are virtually an
infinite number of such propositions to which the proposi-
tion that my office walls are white is equivalent.
In addition to the Analytic Thesis, Bennett proposes
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what he calls the Causal Thesis. The Causal Thesis is sup-
posed to capture Locke's intuition that an object's secon-
dary qualities are somehow caused by or dependent upon its
primary qualities. Bennett's final formulation of the
Causal Thesis is this:
There is some primary quality (p such that: x is (p
and it is a causal law that if anything is both (p
and F then it is
What I think Bennett means by the Causal Thesis is that
there are natural laws governing the behavior of objects
and their percipients which correlate the possession of
P^^ticular determinate primary qualities by objects with
dispositions to appear to normal humans in particular ways.
For example, the skin of a ripe Macintosh apple has a cer-
tain physical structure, that is, a certain set of determin-
ate primary qualities. Normal humans have a certain kind
of sensory apparatus and brain structure. It also happens
that the skin of a ripe Macintosh apple looks red in sun-
light to normal humans. The Causal Thesis tells us, I be-
lieve, that the disposition of the apple to appear this way
to us is a consequence of its having the particular primary
qualities that it does together with the operation of laws
which determine the relations among the physical structures
of objects, the behavior of light, the functioning of human
sensory apparatus and finally, the subjective features of
human perceptual experiences. If the primary qualities of
a Macintosh apple were changed significantly, the apple
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would likely be disposed to produce different visual experi-
ences in normal human percipients. The Causal Thesis tells
us that the primary qualities play a crucial role in deter-
mining what sorts of visual, tactual, olfactory, auditory
and gustatory experiences we will have in our interactions
with physical objects.
The Analytic and Causal Theses together are supposed
to incorporate several allegedly Lockean claims. Bennett
says
,
I call attention to three features of the Analytic
Thesis. (1) According to it, secondary qualities
are dispositional ; 'x is green' is equivalent to a
counter!actual conditional. (2) It represents
secondary qualities as relational ; 'x is green'
means something about items (people) other than x,
and could become false just because of a monadic
change in those other things. (3) It represents
secondary qualities as involving something mental;
'x is green' means something about the occurrence
of a certain kind of idea.^
In addition, the Causal Thesis is supposed to express the
view that an object's secondary qualities are causally de-
pendent upon its primary qualities. From Bennett's discus-
sion we can construct a criterion for determining which
qualities are secondary.
(Bl) Quality Q is secondary iff (i) There is some
primary quality, P, such that it is pos-
sible that some physical object, x, has P
and (ii) there is a causal law that if any
physical object, x, has P and stands in
relation R to a normal human, the human
will have a sensory idea of Q.
Bennett does not specify what relation R is. (Bl) will be
most plausible if we stipulate that relation R is the
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relation perceived under standard observation condi-
^ons by. Let us therefore amend (Bl) to:
(B2) Quality Q is secondary iff (i) There is some
primary quality, P, distinct from Q, suchthat it is possible that some physical
object, X, has P
and (ii) there is a causal law that if any
physical object, x, has P and x is per-
ceived under standard observation condi-
tions by a normal human, the human will
have a sensory idea of Q.
We should note at this point that P may, even must, be a
very complex property. The specification that P be distinct
from Q is added to try to insure that the traditional pri-
mary qualities fail to fulfill the requirements for being
secondary
.
There are serious problems with (B2)
. First, the
reference to primary qualities in condition (i) is disturb-
ing. Bennett has given us very little hint as to how we are
to determine which qualities are primary. Second, I am
suspicious that in spite of our effort to prevent it, some
of the Lockean primary qualities would turn out to be
secondary if we employ (B2) as a criterion. My suspicion
rests on the supposition that if there are laws that connect
primary quality possession with secondary quality possession,
there are probably laws which connect the possession of some
primary qualities with the possession of others. (B2) tells
us roughly that a quality, Q, is secondary just in case there
are primary qualities possession of which by objects disposes
those objects to produce sensory ideas of Q in normal humans
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under standard observation conditions. Now consider the
primary qualities size and shape. The two qualities are
intimately related. It is impossible for any object to have
one without the other, and I believe that an object's having
either quality disposes it to produce sensory ideas of the
other in normal humans under standard observation condi-
tions. Given this, it seems as though both shape and size
fulfill the requirements of (B2)
.
This problem arises because Bennett has not suc-
ceeded in isolating any feature of secondary qualities that
is clearly peculiar to them. Bennett believes that secon-
dary qualities are dispositional, relational, involve some-
thing mental and are dependent on primary qualities, but an
argument is needed to show why we may not describe primarv
qualities in the same way. Bennett recognizes this problem
and tries to provide such an argument. I quote it in full.
The Analytic Thesis says that a thing's having a
given secondary quality is its having a certain
power; and just this, prescinded from any question
of what sort of power, is inapplicable to the
primary qualities of things. We can identify a
glass, say, while remaining ignorant or in dis-
agreement over its secondary qualities; and so we
have the notion of the glass as an object which,
among other facts about it, has certain 'powers'
to affect us in ways which are our basis for
crediting it with colour, taste etc. But we can-
not identify a glass independently of all its
primary qualities such as location, size, shape,
etc. ; and so we cannot have the notion of the glass
as an object which, among other facts about it, af-
fects us in ways which are our basis for crediting
it with primary qualities. Granted that everything
we say about the glass is based on sensory states
it causes us to have, it is still misleading to
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speak of ^ power to make us perceive it as having
a certain shape, size, etc.; for that way of speak-ing suggests that we have some notion of it— someway of identifying and studying the glass~indepen-
aentiy of, and as a preliminary to, discovering v;hatIts primary qualities are.®
Bennett seems to be saying that we cannot identify something
as a physical object while remaining ignorant of or in dis-
agreement over its primary qualities. The notion of a dis-
position of an object is epistemologically posterior to the
notion of the object itself, but in order to have an idea
object itself, we have to have ideas of its primary
qualities. So primary qualities can't be mere dispositions.
Bennett's argument is rather muddled. It is clear
that we can identify something as a physical object while
ignorant of or in disagreement over all its determinate
primary qualities. I can point to a red thing to my left
which I suspect is a physical object and wonder how big,
how solid, and what shape it is. I can also be in doubt as
to whether there is only one red object or two, and whether
it is moving or at rest. I may not be able to identify it
without considering its location relative to other patches
in my visual field, but surely relative location within a
visual field is not to be considered a primary quality.
Furthermore, if I reach out and happen to touch the red
thing, it is reasonable for me to think. Why, this red thing
is solid! I am on my way to discovering that it is indeed a
physical object, but nothing precludes me from saying that a
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physical object is a "something, I know not what" with the
disposition to produce in me sensations of solidity, motion
and the like.
Perhaps Bennett is thinking not of determinate pri-
mary qualities but rather of determinable primaries. Now
it may be true that we cannot determine whether something we
perceive is a physical object while in ignorance about
whether or not it has primary qualities, but I think the
same is true of secondary qualities. We sometimes pick out
physical objects by hearing, smelling or tasting them, and
we usually pick out a physical object by seeing it or feel-
ing it. We can identify a thing as a physical object with-
out hearing, smelling or tasting it, but if we tried but
could neither see it nor touch it, we would not be justified
in calling it a physical object. If we can perceive no
color in it, then v/e cannot see it, and if we perceive no
texture in it, then we cannot feel it. Therefore in order
to identify a perceived thing as a physical object one needs
to perceive it to have at least one secondary quality. This
is not a sufficient condition for such an identification,
but it is a necessary condition. The choice for Bennett is
clear: he can either abandon the argument above or decide
that at least some secondary qualities are not dispositional
for the same reasons he offers to show that primary quali-
ties are not dispositional. The latter alternative involves
abandoning his views about the nature of secondary qualities.
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and the former alternative entails that the primary-
secondary quality distinction Bennett offers fails to do
its job.
A novel account of the distinction between primary
and secondary qualities is offered by J.J.C. Smart in
"Sensations and Brain Processes."^
First of all, let me introduce the concept of a
normal percipient
. One person is more a nomal
percipient than another if he can make color dis-
criminations that the other cannot. For example,
if A can pick a lettuce leaf out of a heap of*
cabbage leaves
,
whereas B cannot though he can
pick a lettuce leaf out of a heap of beetroot
leaves, then A is more normal than B. . . . From
the concept of "more normal than" it is easy to
see how we can introduce the concept of "normal."
. . . In this case the concept of a normal per-
cipient is a slightly idealized one. ... I say
that "This is red" means something roughly like
"A normal percipient would not easily pick this
out of a clump of geranium petals though he would
pick it out of a clump of lettuce leaves." . . .
This account of secondary qualities explains their
unimportance in physics. For obviously the dis-
criminations and lack of discriminations made by
a very complex neurophysiological mechanism are
hardly likely to correspond to simple and non-
arbitrary distinctions in nature.
I therefore elucidate colors as powers, in
Locke's sense, to evoke certain sorts of discrimi-
natory responses in human beings. They are also,
of course, powers to cause sensations in human
beings (an account still nearer Locke's).
Like Bennett, Smart says little here to help us decide what
characterizes primary qualities. Presumably, since secon-
dary qualities are dispositions to cause discriminatory re-
sponses in human beings, primary qualities are not such
dispositions. Smart's passage hints that unlike secondary
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qualities, primary qualities are at least "simple and non-
arbitrary distinctions in nature." what else they are
remains something of a mystery. Let us attribute to Smart
this criterion for identifying secondary qualities;
(S) Quality Q is secondary iff (i) it is possible that
there is a physical object, x, such that x has
and (ii) Q is a disposition to cause Q-like dis-
^^^^i^utory responses in normal human percipi-
ents.
To say that Q is a disposition to cause certain responses in
humans is to say, roughly, that Q is to be analyzed by means
of a counterfactual
,
the antecedent of which specifies cer-
tain sorts of observation conditions and the consequent of
which describes some piece of human behavior. We'll say
tentatively that a Q-like discriminatory response is the
picking out of objects which exhibit Q from those which
don ' t
.
(S) is plagued with a number of difficulties. It is
too vague to be of much use. In spite of Smart's elaborate
attempt to specify what a normal percipient is, it remains
unclear whether his notion of "normal percipient" corres-
ponds with the usual one. Smart's "normal percipient" seems
to be able to make finer discriminations than the rest of us.
This, I think, would wreak havoc with our ideas of the real,
as opposed to the apparent, colors, tastes, smells, etc., of
physical objects. If Smart's normal percipient declares
grass and oak leaves to be of radically different colors, we
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^h^ll h3.VG to taks his woird for it.
A more serious problem involves the notion of a Q-
like discriminatory response. If to have Q involves nothing
more than having the power to evoke Q-like discriminatory
responses, one wonders on what basis normal humans make Q-
like discriminatory responses. These responses are not
caused by differences in our perceptual experiences, since
Q is not a sensible quality. Ordinarily we would say that
we distinguish geranium petals from lettuce leaves on the
basis of their color
,
which we determine by attending to the
differing visual experiences they produce in us; that is, we
r^otice that geranium petals are red and that lettuce leaves
are green and make a discrim.inatory response based on what
we have noticed. But if (S) is true, to notice the color
of geranium petals is simply to notice that we make such and
such a discriminatory response in the presence of geranium
petals. We can wonder v;hat it is about geranium petals, if
not their color, which causes or enables us to make dis-
criminatory responses. D.M. Armstrong raises this question
in a discussion of Smart's treatment of secondary qualities.
Armstrong says.
Suppose there are a number of pieces of cloth which
are not discriminable in respect of shape, size or
texture but that some of them are a certain shade of
blue, while others are a certain shade of green. I
am a normal percipient and I succeed in sorting the
pieces of cloth according to their colour. According
to Smart it would be misleading to say that I make a
distinction between the two classes on the basis of
their different colour. The separation logically
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precedes the colour-difference, not the colour dif-ference the separation. To be a piece of cloth of
f
colour from another means that I do suchthings as putting the pieces of cloth in differentpiles.
will be objected, there must be a
real difference between the pieces of blue and greencloth, otherwise we would not make a difference be-tween them, use words like 'same' and 'different'in a certain way, and, in general, react to thepieces of cloth differently.^^
Armstrong provides Smart with a reply.
Smart, I take it, would reply to this by saying
that there are real differences in the two sorts
of cloth, differences in their primary qualities,
although probably no simple or clear-cut differ-
ences. These differences affect the very com-
plicated mechanism that is our brain and nervous
system in different ways, causing our differences
in reaction. 12
Were Smart to adopt this defense, I think he would eventual-
ly produce an attempt at a primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction very much like Bennett's. Since Smart is willing
to say that secondary qualities are powers to cause sensa-
tions in human beings, he might be better off to abandon the
view that they are also powers' to cause discriminatory
responses in humans.
For the moment, let us assume that Smart's account
of secondary qualities as powers of objects to evoke dis-
criminatory responses in normal percipients is satisfactory.
We would still not have an adequate means of distinguishing
secondary from primary qualities, for primary qualities,
too, may be described as powers of objects to evoke dis-
criminatory responses in normal percipients. Paraphrasing
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Smart, we might say that 'This is elliptoid' means something
roughly like A normal percipient would not easily pick this
out of a basket of eggs though he would pick it out of a
basket of dominoes.' Similarly, 'Jones is six-feet five'
means something roughly like 'A normal percipient would not
easily pick Jones out of a group of basketball players
though he would pick Jones out of a group of second-graders.'
I see no obvious problems with these "analyses" that are not
also problems with the corresponding analyses of secondary
qualities. Although to say that Jones' height is a matter
of his distinguishability from schoolchildren seems somehow
/ it is not more so than to say that the color of
Petals is merely a matter of their distinguishabil—
ity from lettuce leaves.
Smart might try, as Bennett does, to argue that we
have to have a notion of a physical object before we can
have a notion of its powers, but as we have seen, having a
notion of a physical object requires more than knowledge of
its primary qualities, so this attempt to justify the dis-
tinction would backfire. Nothing yet forbids us to say that
a physical object is something that has non-dispositional
secondary qualities and, secondarily, dispositions to evoke
"primary quality" discriminatory responses in us.
J.L. Mackie
,
who, as we have noted, believes that
secondary qualities are dispositions, tries to show that
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primary qualities may not be considered dispositions also.
He says.
Someone might argue that primary qualities too
should be identified with powers. A square objecthas the power to produce the idea of squareness inme in favourable conditions of observation. Ad-
mittedly there are such powers. But we also need
a term to refer to the intrinsic features of their
powers, and it is this job that is done bythe phrase 'primary quality.' A large part of thebasis of a thing's power to produce the idea of
squareness will, moreover, be its literally being
square, its having a shape-quality which is justlike the shape-quality v/hich we find in the exoeri-
ential content to which the thing gives rise.^^
Mackie argues that powers must have some ground or base. In
physical objects, the ground of powers consists of the
primary qualities. Therefore, primary qualities are not
themselves dispositions. The difference betv/een primary
and secondary qualities, then, is that secondary qualities
are mere pov/ers while the primary qualities are the ground
or base for those powers.
Mackie 's argument is successful only if the dispo-
sitional nature of secondary qualities has already been
established by an independent argument. I believe that
Mackie appeals to the Resemblance Thesis to establish this,
but the Resemblance Thesis does not entail Mackie 's position.
From the supposition that there is nothing in objects re-
sembling our ideas of secondary qualities it does not follow
that secondary qualities are mere dispositions. Furthermore,
as we have seen, RT itself cannot be justified. Here Mackie
unv/ittingly suggests to us an argument to show that secondary
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qualities are non-dispositional
. We could reason along
Mackie's lines that secondary qualities must be in objects
as grounds or bases of dispositions to appear in certain
ways rather than being those dispositions themselves.
Perhaps Mackie gives us some reason to believe that
primary qualities are non-dispositional, but that will not
suffice to support a primary-secondary quality distinction
like what Bennett and Smart have in mind. What is needed is
an argument that primary qualities are non-dispositional
that does not also imply that secondary qualities are non-
dispositional. Mackie does not provide such an argument,
and I suspect that any such argument would presuppose some
version of the primary-secondary quality distinction inde-
pendent of and perhaps incompatible with the disposition-
non-disposition distinction.
II
The views about secondary qualities we have dis-
cussed so far have one striking feature in common: they
all say that secondary qualities are essentially disposi-
tional and thereby imply that primary qualities are not.
As we have seen, this dichotomy has been left unjustified.
In each case, we have found no reason why the proposed
criterion for identifying secondary qualities will not
admit as secondary at least some of the traditional primary
qualities. Part of the explanation for this failure may be
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that none of the philosophers considered so far has said
much about primary qualities except by implication. (in
fairness to Smart, it should be noted that he does not take
himself to be offering a detailed analysis of the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary qualities.)
In "On the Attributes of Material Things, C.J.
Ducasse presents a fairly well developed version of the
distinction. He begins by regarding all properties as
essentially causal or dispositional and goes on to make a
primary-secondary quality distinction that is finer than
any I have considered so far. At the outset, Ducasse dis-
tinguishes between properties and qualities. For him,
qualities are v/hat are often referred to as "perceived
qualities" or properties of sensory states, and properties
are what we have hitherto called qualities. Accordingly, I
shall temporarily switch my terminology and discuss
Ducasse 's version of the primary-secondary property dis-
tinction .
Section 7 of Ducasse 's paper is headed "Property is
an Essentially Causal Concept." Ducasse opens.
Examples in which the essentially causal nature of
properties is obvious would be fragility, malle-
ability, fusibility, ductility, rigidity, imperme-
ability, etc. No argument is needed to show that
any attempt to make explicit what such properties
consist in v/ould have to take the form of an ac-
count of what is caused when . . . Properties such
as these . . . are describable in terms of kinds
of effects produced in the thing that has them by
certain causes under certain circumstances.!^
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But, according to Ducasse, there are other properties, for
example, abrasiveness, corrosiveness and poisonousness which
are describable in terms of kinds of effects caused
g.r^Qther thing when the thing that has the propertyIS brought into a certain relation to that otherthing, 1°
and presumably, describable only in those terms. Ducasse
makes a further distinction: between properties which are
such that the effect in terms of which they are described
is a physical state and those properties which are such that
the effect in terms of which they are described is a state
of consciousness, "in particular, a sensation It is
this latter kind of property that Ducasse calls secondary
properties. The former he considers primary properties. He
explains
,
When for instance we speak of carborundum as being
abrasive
,
we mean that friction of it against such
other physical surfaces as steel, glass, etc.,
causes their surfaces to wear away. The effect
which is caused when such friction takes place in
no way requires for its occurrence the existence
of a conscious being, nor does it for its descrip-
tion in any way require inclusion therein of the
supposition that such beings exist. Its descrip-
tion can be given in purely physical terms.
But if, on the contrary, a rose is spoken of
as being fragrant
,
this means that it is such that
under certain conditions its near presence causes
in human beings the state of consciousness desig-
nated as a pleasant olfactory sensation. ... In
such cases, since the effect in terms of which the
property is defined consists of a state of con-
sciousness, it obviously can not occur without the
actual existence of some conscious being, nor can
a description of it be given that does not include
the supposition of the existence of such a being.
Ducasse also distinguishes real from apparent secondary
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properties by mentioning standard observation conditions
tSe! Sther o^nSt it’b; af?h
tLr2ei?Lda^ron“r?r"^°"
grelLfs"^"^'^"^ observer"of“?t Sfthe 001^^'''
Ducasse means to include among the primary proper-
ties not only the Lockean primary qualities but also what
Locke calls tertiary qualities. Locke offers as an example
of a tertiary quality the power in fire to melt wax. 2 °
Since this power is a power to produce in objects effects
Which are describable in purely physical terms, it appears
to meet Ducasse' s requirement for property primacy.
Ducasse 's analysis incorporates some aspects of
Bennett's analysis. For example, Ducasse 's secondary proper-
ties are dispositional, relational and involve something
mental. Unlike Bennett, hov/ever
, Ducasse thinks that what
distinguishes secondary from primary properties is not all
three of these features, but rather just the last. For
Ducasse, all properties are dispositional and relational,
but not all need involve something mental. Ducasse 's treat-
ment of the subject is superior to Bennett's in that he does
not have to try to show that primary properties cannot be
mere dispositions of objects. He need only establish that
only in an analysis of secondary properties do we require
reference to states of consciousness or sensations
.
Ducasse 's position involves three points: ( 1 ) all
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properties are essentially causal or dispositional, that is,
every property is properly analyzed by means of a subjunc-
tive conditional the antecedent of which specifies some set
of conditions and the consequent of which describes effects
that are produced under such conditions; (2) the primary
properties are ones whose defining effects are purely
physical states; and (3) the secondary properties are those
whose defining effects are states of consciousness. For
example, Ducasse says.
To say that glass is fragile
,
for example, is to
say that impact by a hard substance readily causes
it to break; to say that gold is malleable is to
say that hammering causes it to change shape with-
out breaking, etc.^^
That the defining effects of fragility and malleability are
physical states is supposed to show that they are primary
properties. The properties of being irritating or unplea-
sant, however, are secondary properties.
Again, if a person is spoken of as being irritat-
ing or an unpleasant individual, this means that
he is such that in certain relations to other
persons, he behaves in ways that cause in them
the feelings called irritation or discomfort
.
Ducasse 's first point is that every property is to
be analyzed in terms of two other properties. I think that
the easiest way to elucidate what Ducasse is doing here is
to begin by recognizing his distinction between properties
which are describable in terms of kinds of effects produced
in the thing that has them and those properties which are
describable in terms of kinds of effects caused in other
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things by the thing that has them. For convenience I'll
call the first kind of property type-1 properties and the
second kind type-2 properties.
Type-1 properties are analyzed roughly this way:
where P, C, and E are all properties, a thing, x, has
property P just in case were x to have C, it would have E.
Let us call property C the antecedent of the analysis of
P; we will call E the consequent of the analysis of P. The
possession of C by x constitutes the fulfillment of condi-
tions sufficient to bring it about that x has E. Ducasse
calls the state of affairs consisting in x's having E the
"defining effect" of P. We will stipulate that if the state
of affairs consisting in x's having E has no states of con-
sciousness as constituents, then x's having E is a physical
state of affairs. Similarly, if the state of affairs con-
sisting in x's having E has only states of consciousness as
constituents, then x's having E is a mental state of af-
fairs. If x's having E is a physical state of affairs, we
will say that E is a physical property. If x's having E is
a mental state of affairs we will say that E is a mental
property. So if x's having E is identical to, say x's
doubling in size, then E is a physical property because x's
doubling in size involves no states of consciousness. If,
however, x's having E is identical to x's feeling embar-
rassed, then E is a mental property since embarrassment is
a state of consciousness.
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Type-2 properties are analyzed in a similar way,
except that E, the consequent of the analysis of P, is a
property possessed by some entity other than the entity
that has P. Roughly, then, where P, c, and E are proper-
ties, a thing, x, has property P just in case were x to
have C, some thing, y, distinct from x, would have E. Just
as with type-1 properties, if y's having E has no states of
consciousness as constituents, then E is a physical property;
otherwise, E is mental. Both primary and secondary proper-
ties can be of either type-1 or type-2.
Ducasse's second and third points, then, can be
expressed by saying that the consequent of the analysis of
a primary property is always a physical property and that
the consequent of the analysis of a secondary property is
always a mental property. Let us then attribute to Ducasse
the following criteria for distinguishing between primary
and secondary properties:
(Dl) Property P is primary iff (i) it is possible that
there is a physical object, x, such that x
has P
and (ii) the consequent of the analysis of P is
a physical property.
(D2) Property P is secondary iff (i) it is possible
that there is some physical object, x, such
that X has P
and (ii) the consequent of the analysis of P is
a mental property.
The first question that comes to mind upon encount-
ering Ducasse's views about the nature of properties is
whether it is possible that all properties of material
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objects are dispositional. Such a claim presents three dif-
ficulties. First, if every property is to be analyzed in
terms of two other properties, it appears that a really
thorough non-circular analysis of a given property would be
infinitely long. If property P is analyzed by means of
properties Q and R, and Q and R are analyzed by means of
other properties, and so on, the process will never reach
an end. Second, Ducasse's view entails that no property is
simple or unanalyzable
. There has been, of course, heated
debate on the question of whether certain properties are in
fact unanalyzable. We should not expect that Ducasse can
effectively silence all such discussion without having dealt
with at least some of the arguments that have been presented
to show that some properties are simple. Third, the intui-
tion endures that objects must have some non-dispositional
or "manifest" properties in terms of which their disposi-
tional properties are explained, analyzed or accounted for.
Ducasse does not address himself to this issue at all.
Having mentioned this problem, I am now going to
ignore it. Although it is a potential source of trouble for
Ducasse's view, the sorts of issues involved are only minim-
ally related to our primary concerns. Even if it could be
shown that it is impossible that all properties be disposi-
tions, it does not follow that either the traditional pri-
mary or the traditional secondary qualities must be non-
dispositional. The non-dispositional properties of objects
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could be other, perhaps unknown, properties. There may
still be merit in distinguishing primary from secondary
properties on the grounds that they are two different sorts
of dispositions. That is what we are concerned to discover
We turn, then, to an evaluation of (Dl) and (D2)
.
The first question to ask is what reason there is
to believe that (D2) might be true, that is, what reason
there is to believe that secondary properties are properly
analyzed in terms of states of consciousness. Ducasse's
argument for this contention relies on features of the mean
ings of terms which express secondary properties. One of
the examples he uses is the word 'green.' He says that it,
like other terras which express secondary properties,
have two or rather three distinct meanings—one
physical, one ohysiological and one psychologi-
cal. 24
Presumably, the "physical" definition of 'green' involves
a description of what happens when light of various wave-
lengths strikes green objects. Ducasse suggests that in
the physical sense of 'green,' to say that a tree is green
would then mean that when struck by a beam of
sunlight, it reflects light vibrations of one
of the component frequencies, and absorbs the
others
.
Although Ducasse does not say much about the physiological
meaning of 'green,' one supposes that, in that sense of
'green, ' to say that a tree is green would mean that per-
ception of the tree by sentient entities brings about
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certain states in the brain and sensory apparatus of the
entity.
Ducasse's claim that secondary properties are to be
analyzed in terms of states of consciousness appears to
rest solely on his belief that the psychological meanings of
secondary quality terms are the most common and usual ones.
The fact is that the original and usual meaning of
• . . such words as sound, color, heat, etc., is
the psychological one; and that much later these
terms came to be borrowed by specialists to desig-
nate physical facts of the same sort as those which
cause in conscious beings the normal sensations of
sound, color, etc., or to designate physiological
events on which depends the occurrence of these
sensations
.
Ducasse concludes that
to admit this hardly deniable fact is at the same
time to admit the legitimacy of the distinction on
the basis proposed above, between primary and
secondary properties . 27
Ducasse's argument that the original and usual meanings of
secondary property terms is the psychological one will seem
familiar.
Everyone understands the sort of effect meant when
quinine is spoken of as being bitter. That effect
is a certain psychological state, a certain taste
sensation, perfectly known to everybody in the mere
occurrence thereof, and knowable in no other way.
That what constitutes the meaning which the word
"bitter" has for everyone is that kind of psycho-
logical occurrence, and not some physical character
or physiological event, is shown by the fact that,
so far as the v^riter has heard, no one as yet knows
just what the physical character is that distin-
guishes "bitter" substances from others, nor just
what the physiological events are that distinguish
the effect of those substances on the gustatory
nerves from the effect of others. But in spite of
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that universal, or at all events, nearly universal,ignorance, the meaning of the word "bitter" is uni-
versally known. 28
Ducasse is arguing that since people know what 'bitter'
means without knowing what physical effects bitter things
bring about, 'bitter' cannot mean anything like having the
disposition to bring about such physical effects and there-
fore, bitterness is not the same property as the disposition
to bring about such and such physical effects. Ducasse
believes a similar argument is available for each of the
determinate and determinable secondary properties
,
so
that it can be shown that secondary properties are not iden-
tical with dispositions to produce physical effects.
This argument deserves a closer examination, but it
is difficult to reconstruct it precisely. To begin with,
let us assume that there is some physical property that all
and only bitter things have, and let us assume further that
it is the possession of this property by an entity which
accounts for its ability to produce a particular sort of
taste sensation. We can call this property 'property B.
'
I think that the conclusion of Ducasse 's argument is twofold
first, since 'bitter' does not mean having property B, the
property of being bitter is not identical to property B; and
second, the usual meaning of 'bitter' is the "psychological"
one. Ducasse gives only one argument for both conclusions.
We can agree that if 'bitter' does not mean having property
B, then being bitter is not the same as having property B,
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even though the two properties may be coextensive. We can
concentrate, then, on the question of whether 'bitter'
means having property B. Ducasse's argument that it does
not, which is also his argument for the conclusion that the
usual meaning of 'bitter' is the psychological one, depends
on two claims: (1) that everyone knows what 'bitter' means;
and (2) that not everyone knows what the physical character
is that distinguishes bitter substances from others. We can
readily agree that (2) is true and focus on (1). Ducasse's
reason for saying that everyone knows what 'bitter' means is
that "everyone understands the sort of effect meant when
is spoken of as being bitter." Suppose we assume
that everyone is familiar with this effect. This supposi-
tion does not show that everyone knows what 'bitter' means
unless it has already been established that bitterness is
just that "sort of effect," the quality that the taste of
quinine has, that is, that bitterness is a property of sen-
sory states. Of course, the Ducassean dispositional analy-
sis of bitterness is incompatible with analyzing bitterness
as an occurrent property of sensory states. Ducasse fails
to provide us with a reason to believe (1)
.
It will be objected that the fact of universal
familiarity with bitter tastes must show something about
people's knowledge of the property of being bitter. I
agree, but it is not altogether clear what it does show.
Perhaps it shows that everyone knows the psychological
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effect by which bitter things are distinguished from others,
that people know how to pick out those things which have
the property of being bitter. I don't think it shows that
anyone knows what bitterness really is; nor does it show
that the meaning of 'bitter' is psychological.
Although Ducasse's argument does not prove what he
thinks it does
,
something like it can be used to show that
the disposition to produce 'bitter' taste sensations is not
identical with property B, for someone might perfectly well
understand what the former property is while knowing nothing
of the latter. For the moment, then, let us grant that all
and only bitter objects have these two distinct properties
and that 'bitter' expresses both of them. That granted, let
us examine the consequences of adopting (Dl) and (D2).
One feature of Ducasse's view that we can note right
away is that it holds that many property-expressing terms
express more than one property. The word 'green,' for in-
stance, expresses at least two and possibly three properties.
'Green' defined psychologically expresses a secondary prop-
erty, while 'green' defined physically expresses a primary
property and perhaps, when defined physiologically, ex-
presses a third property, also primary. The same will be
true for all secondary-property terms.
A second feature, which is a problem somewhat peri-
pheral to our main interests, concerns properties tradition-
ally thought to be neither primary nor secondary. Tradi-
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tional primary- secondary property distinctions are not
usually meant to be exhaustive, but it is apparent that
Ducasse means his to be so. It is worthwhile to point out,
therefore, that as it stands it seems to fail to do this.
There are many properties of material objects which seem
clearly to be analyzable in terms of both mental states
produced by those things that have them and physical
states produced by those things that have them. Two that
come to mind are the property of being nauseating and the
property of being sexually arousing. A complete account of
these properties would include reference to both mental and
physical states. According to (Dl) and (D2)
,
then, neither
of these properties is either primary or secondary. Ducasse
might claim that 'nauseating' and 'sexually arousing' each
has two senses, one of which is a primary property and one
of which is a secondary property, but such a claim would be
implausible
.
This problem can be solved with only a small change
in (D2). Condition (ii) of (D2) specifies that the conse-
quent of the analysis of a secondary property must be a
mental property. We required that a mental property be such
that the state of affairs consisting in someone's having
that property has only states of consciousness as constitu-
ents. This requirement was made in order to express
Ducasse 's view accurately. Ducasse never says so explicitly,
but he does suggest that the defining effects of secondary
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properties are psychological only rather than mixed. Since
we can find apparent counterexamples to (D2)
,
it requires
revision. Rather than changing the wording of (d2) , we
can re-define 'mental property' in the following way: we
shall say that E is a mental property only if something's
having E is a mental state of affairs and that a state of
mental if it has at least one state of conscious-
ness as a constituent. Now (Dl) and (D2) are exhaustive;
further, they appear to yield the appropriate result that
the properties of being nauseating
,
being sexually arousing
and other "mixed" properties are secondary.
A more serious criticism can be made. As we have
seen, Ducasse says that all terms traditionally thought to
express secondary properties have two or three distinct
meanings, that is, they express two or three distinct
properties. If we accept this contention—and the success
of Ducasse 's distinction depends on it—we have every reason
to believe that the same is true of all those terms usually
thought to express primary properties. For example, con-
sider the property of being solid. Since it is one of the
traditional primary properties, Ducasse undoubtedly believes
that solidity should be analyzed in terms of the physical
effects caused by solid things. An analysis of solidity
would probably include the property of resisting penetration.
We can agree that an essential feature of solid things is
that they are disposed to resist penetration. However, all
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solid things have other dispositions as well, most notably,
the disposition to appear solid to sentient creatures. An
analysis of this disposition would have as its consequent a
mental property; therefore, the disposition to appear solid
is a secondary property. It is reasonable to suppose that
the name of this property is 'solidity.' So it looks as
though the word 'solid' expresses two distinct disposition-
al properties, one primary and one secondary.
Since all the traditional primary properties are
sensible, the terms that express them express at least two
properties. One of these properties is a disposition to
bring about certain physical states under given conditions
and is therefore primary. The other of these properties is
a disposition to bring about, under specifiable conditions,
certain states of consciousness and is therefore secondary.
Hence the terms 'colored,' 'sweet,' 'odiferous,' 'cubical,'
'extended,' 'microscopic,' etc., each expresses at least
two properties, one primary and one secondary.
All of this shows that Ducasse's primary-secondary
property distinction is simply a distinction between dis-
positions of objects to bring about physical states of
affairs and their dispositions to bring about mental states
of affairs. There is no doubt that there is such a dis-
tinction among dispositions
,
but I do not believe it is one
that we would naturally want to describe as a primary-
secondary property distinction. I say this not because I
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have any qualms about the arbitrary dubbing of the one kind
of disposition 'primary' and the other 'secondary,' but be-
cause Ducasse's enterprise seems to blur the traditional
primary-secondary quality distinction. Although linguistic
considerations do not usually play a role in discussions of
primary and secondary properties, it is natural to hope that
one feature of a primary-secondary property distinction is
that It tells us that those properties we intend to express
by the words 'solid,' 'spherical,' 'six feet tall,' and the
like are primary and that those properties we intend to
express by the words 'purple,' 'bitter,' 'loud,' etc., are
secondary. Ducasse's property distinction does not have
this feature, however. If Ducasse is correct, all the
property-expressing terms above are ambiguous; they express
both a primary and a secondary property and in some cases,
more than one primary property.
But perhaps we expect too much. Ducasse's primary-
secondary property distinction involves one rather interest-
ing claim about language. Although 'hot' and, say, 'round'
each expresses both a primary and a secondary property,
Ducasse contends that 'hot' in its ordinary or usual sense
expresses a primary property; that is, those words usually
taken to express primary properties do so when given their
ordinary senses. This contention, if true, would not itself
constitute a primary-secondary property distinction, but it
would serve to link Ducasse's version of the distinction to
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the more traditional ones. The link, however, would not be
a sturdy or stable one. First, if we do use words in the
Way Ducasse suggests, it is a contingent fact that we do.
Second, it is easy to imagine that our word usage might
change in such a way that we use 'hot,' 'red' and so on most
often to express physical properties of objects.
Nevertheless, it is worth discussing whether
Ducasse 's assertion about our linguistic habits is true.
What reasons are there for thinking that words like 'hot,'
'red,' 'smooth,' and so forth are most often used to express
dispositions to produce in percipients sensations of par-
ticular kinds? One reason for thinking so is suggested by
Ducasse 's argument about bitterness. If we don't know what
physical characteristics distinguish, say, bitter things
from others, it must be that we can't mean to express the
property of having those characteristics by using the word
'bitter.' The argument would go on to suggest that since
the taste of bitter things is what we know best about them
qua bitter things, we must mean by 'bitter,' tastes such and
such a way to normal humans.
I do not find this argument entirely persuasive.
29Kripke has argued that terms like 'hot,' 'loud,' and
'red,' as well as terms for natural kinds and natural phe-
nomena like heat, light and sound, are more like proper
names than is often realized. He argues, for example, that
'tiger' is a word used to designate a particular species of
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animal. Anything not of the proper species— for instance,
something that looked like a tiger but had a reptilian
internal structure— is not properly called 'tiger.' Compe-
tent users of the word 'tiger' need not know what physio-
logical structure it is that distinguishes tigers from
other animals; nevertheless, it is the property of having
just such a structure that the word 'tiger' expresses. It
may be that the traditional secondary property terms are
like the word 'tiger' ; that is, they are used to designate
particular properties the nature of which may not be fully
understood. I mention Kripke's view because it is an al-
ternative to Ducasse's conclusion that if people use 'bitter'
without knowing the distinguishing physical characteristics
of bitter things, then since they can't mean by 'bitter'
having such and such physical characteristics, they must
have some psychological effect in mind. On Kripke's view,
I take it, the person who uses the word 'bitter' without
knowing the distinguishing physical characteristics of
bitter things does not know what property 'bitter' expresses,
although he does’ know how to pick out bitter things. Some
will find this consequence objectionable, perhaps so much
so that Ducasse's view will seem all the more attractive in
comparison. There is a good deal of evidence, however, that
Ducasse's contention is false.
First, if the traditional secondary property terms
denote or express dispositions to appear in certain ways to
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normal humans, one should be surprised to find that they are
often used to denote insensible phenomena. Yet is is a
commonplace that there are sounds that humans cannot hear,
but which dogs can, or that there is light we cannot see.
We say these things, I think, without any sense of having
violated the ordinary usage of the words 'sound' or 'light.
'
Second, if it is true that we use secondary property terms
in the way that Ducasse says
,
we would expect that certain
attributions of properties to objects would be thought cor-
rect which in fact are thought incorrect. For example, if
Ducasse 's views are accurate, 'purple polka-dotted' v/ould
mean, roughly, disposed under noirmal conditions to produce
round purple visual sensa in normal humans. If 'purple
polka-dotted' did mean this, it would be correct to say that
photo flash cubes are, when triggered, purple polka-dotted,
since normal people who look at them see purple spots. But
it is not correct to say this, which shows that our attri-
butions of secondary properties to things rely less on mere
sensory phenomena than Ducasse suspects. Here is a more
unlikely, yet perhaps more convincing example. Suppose
there were an apparatus which, although at room temperature
itself, was constructed so that when touched it would pro-
duce in humans the sensation we usually describe as a sen-
sation of warmth. The creation of such a device is not, I
think, beyond present technological capabilities. If
Ducasse 's view about the ordinary meaning of the word 'hot'
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were correct, then we would naturally describe this piece
of apparatus as hot. But of course we would not do so;
instead we would say that it makes us feel hot, or some
such thing. Consider, too, that there are certain very
potent spices which, when ingested, cause us to feel warm
and flushed. Curiously enough, we do describe such spices
as hot, but when pressed, we would say that this or that
P^^ticular spicy dish is not really hot— it may have re-
cently come from the refrigerator—but that it makes us feel
hot. Third, there are some secondary property terms, for
example, 'heavy,' 'hard' and 'soft' which, I think, are
ordinarily defined solely in terms of physical effects
caused by the things that have them. If the ordinary person
were asked to define these words, he might well, in the
first case, talk about the behavior of objects on scales,
in the second, talk about scratching and breaking behavior,
and in the third, talk about squishiness and compressibil-
ity. If so, then 'heavy,' 'hard,' and 'soft' express, in
their ordinary sense, primary properties.
I think that the examples I have given show that
Ducasse is wrong in thinking that secondary property terms
are used most often to express dispositions to cause par-
ticular kinds of sensory experiences. Most of my examples
are of objects which have such dispositions but to which we
would refuse to apply the relevant secondary property terms.
Though I think these examples show Ducasse is wrong, they
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raise interesting puzzles about the meanings of some secon-
dary property terms. They suggest that we demand that some
physical requirements be met before we attribute secondary
qualities to objects, but it is not clear what these require-
ments are. Some of these cases suggest that something like
Kripke's theory may be correct, but I am unwilling to com-
mit myself further than to say that they show that Ducasse's
theory is incorrect.
We have found several problems with Ducasse's attempt
to distinguish primary from secondary properties by analyz-
ing them as different sorts of dispositions. Although
Ducasse succeeds in isolating two distinct kinds of property,
his distinction bears very little similarity to the tradi-
tional ones. Insofar as it does resemble Lockean versions
of the distinction it involves claims about word usage that
are probably false and even if true, rather inconsequential.
We should conclude that Ducasse has failed to draw an ade-
quate primary-secondary property distinction.
Ill
Of the attempts at a primary-secondary quality
distinction that have been examined in this chapter, none
has been successful, and their failure bodes ill for further
attempts along these lines. If one tries to distinguish
primary from secondary qualities on the grounds that the
latter group is dispositional while the former group is not.
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one will have trouble justifying this claim. if, on the
other hand, one regards all qualities as dispositional, one
encounters the problem of showing in what way the primary
dispositions differ from the secondary. Although this
whole family of attempts is unpromising, there is one final
point worth making about them. These versions of the
primary-secondary quality distinction have implications
about the nature of secondary qualities which run counter to
traditional intuitions about them, and they undermine some
traditional motivations for drawing a primary-secondary
quality distinction. This fact would not be noteworthy were
it not that Locke and Bennett seem unaware of it.
The traditional intuition of which I speak is the
belief that secondary qualities are in some way more capri-
cious and evanescent than the primaries. The Alteration
Argument, discussed in Chapter IV, attempts to provide a
rational foundation for this belief. I am not now concerned
with the issue of whether the argument succeeds. I am con-
cerned only to show that, given a dispositional account of
secondary qualities, all versions of the argument are un-
sound. Yet some philosophers who have offered the Alteration
Argument have simultaneously held a dispositional account of
secondary qualities.
In Chapter IV, we discussed at length Locke's por-
phyry argument, to be found at II, viii, 19 of the Essay .
The first premise of that argument is:
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(1) When the light is shut off, the color of theporphyry vanishes.
The argument then proceeds to point out that the porphyry
has undergone no change and concludes that the porphyry's
loss of color does not require any physical alteration in
the porphyry itself.
Discussing a similar argument about taste, Bennett
suggests that it may beg the question.
That argument is not valid. For in the situation
envisaged, the substance v/ould have undergone a
change, namely a change of its taste.
The corresponding comment in this case would be that the
porphyry has undergone an alteration, namely a change of
color. In any case, Bennett has completely overlooked a
glaring inconsistency between the argument and the disposi-
tional account of secondary qualities, and that is that if
the dispositional account is true, then premise (1) of the
porphyry argument is false. According to dispositional
analyses of secondary qualities, the color of the porphyry
is just its disposition to appear red and white when the
lights are on. When the lights are shut off, this disposi-
tion does not "vanish"; rather, it is no longer being exer-
cised by the porphyry. So when the lights are shut off, it
is not the case that the color of the porphyry vanishes or
changes. A dispositional analysis of secondary qualities
entails that to say that the porphyry is red and white is to
say that were certain specified conditions met, it would
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produce red and white sense-data in a normal human being.
When these conditions are not fulfilled, it no longer pro-
duces red and white sense-data, but it is still true that
were the right conditions met, the porphyry would appear to
be red and white. The support for premise (1) is that at
one time a statement attributing a color to the porphyry is
true and at a later time false. But the corresponding coun-
terfactual is true at both times. When the lights are off,
the porphyry is still red and white, if a dispositional
analysis of secondary qualities is true. Yet immediately
after the porphyry argument we find Locke offering a disposi-
tional account of colors.
It has, indeed, such a configuration of particles,
both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of
light rebounding from some parts of that hard
stone, to produce in us the idea of redness, and
from others the idea of whiteness; but whiteness
and redness are not in it at any time, but such a
texture that hath the power to produce such a
sensation in us.^^
Bennett, in his paper "Substance, Reality, and Pri-
mary Qualities," offers a version of the Alteration Argument
which he calls the phenol argument.
Suppose a world where phenol-thio-urea is unquali-
fiedly bitter, i.e., tastes so to almost everyone.
Suppose further that a dynasty of world dictators
begins intensive breeding of non-tasters and
gradually allows the tasters to die out. . . .
After a few dozen generations, phenol-thio-urea
is tasteless to everyone living, so that there
are as good grounds for calling phenol-thio-urea
tasteless as for calling water tasteless.
This describes a course of events in which
something (a) is bitter at one time, (b) is taste-
less at a later time, and (c) does not itself
change in the interim. ^2
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Again, Bennett thinks the argument begs the question, yet he
believes it has a certain force and the rest of his article
is devoted to an explanation of that phenomenon.
A similar brief statement of the argument is offered
by Robert Cummins: "Were everyone to become blind, nothing
would typically or normally appear blue, and hence nothing
"3 T
would be blue."
These arguments are somewhat trickier to deal with
than the Lockean argument. At first glance, all the pre-
mises seem to be compatible with a dispositional analysis of
secondary qualities, but a closer examination of the phenol
argument will prove that compatibility illusory.
(1) Phenol is bitter = Under standard conditions
phenol appears bitter to normal humans.
(2) If human beings change in such a way that under
standard conditions phenol no longer appears
bitter to normal humans, then phenol is no
longer bitter.
(3) If, if human beings change in such a way that
under standard conditions phenol no longer ap-
pears bitter to normal humans, then phenol is
no longer bitter, then the taste of phenol
changes
.
(4) The taste of phenol changes.
(5) No change is made in phenol.
(6) The phenol's change of taste does not require
an alteration of the phenol.
The apparent success of the argument is derived from an
equivocation of the expressions 'standard conditions' and
normal humans .
'
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On a dispositional analysis of secondary qualities,
which premise (1) expresses, the argument is not sound.
Earlier we mentioned the problem of real versus
apparent secondary qualities. In order to justify statements
like, "My shirt looks blue now but it's really white" we
have to appeal to standard observation conditions and normal
human percipients. The phenol argument assumes that if
standards of normality change, then objects can lose certain
of their dispositions, that is, they can actually lose their
secondary qualities without a change in their physical struc-
ture. The defect in this assumption becomes apparent when
we investigate what it means to say, for example, that under
standard observation conditions pine cones appear brown to
normal human percipients. It means that, given the neuro-
physiological structure of humans at the present time, and
certain facts about the condition of our sun and its rela-
tion to the earth, in daylight, the majority of humans have
a sensory idea of the color brown when they look at pine
cones. Our expressions 'standard observation conditions' and
'normal human perceiver' are linguistic shorthand for a
cumbersome scientific description of things as they are now.
Thus these expressions are implicitly time-indexed to the
interval of time during which conditions have been about the
same as they are now, and if the expressions 'normal' and
'standard' are implicitly subscripted, then they can express
different concepts at different times and are not intersub-
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stitutible in all contexts. We should perhaps re-state
premise (1)
.
(1') Phenol is bitter at t = Under standardt
conditions phenol appears bitter to normal^,
humans
.
Since premise (2) was derived from premise (1), premise (2)
would have to be re-stated as:
(2') If human beings change in such a way that under
standardt conditions phenol no longer appears
bitter to normal^ humans, then phenol is no
longer bitter at t'.
Remembering that 'phenol is bitter at t ' ' means that under
standard^
1
conditions phenol appears bitter to normal^,
humans, we see that 'phenol is bitter at t' does not neces-
sarily mean the same as 'phenol is bitter at t ' .
'
In the
case under consideration, there is no contradiction in as-
serting that phenol is bitter at t and phenol is not bitter
at t'. If taste is a disposition, nothing warrants our
saying that the taste of phenol has changed, for at t',
phenol has the same disposition that it had at t, namely,
a disposition to appear bitter to normal^ humans under
standard^ conditions. So premise (3) is false. What
changes is not the taste of phenol. Just as we suspected
all along, all that changes is the humans who taste phenol.
I have shown that attempts to distinguish primary
from secondary qualities by analyzing secondary qualities
as dispositions of a peculiar sort fail to point to signifi-
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cant differences between the traditional primary and secon-
dary qualities. I have tried to provide reasons why any
such attempt will fail. Furthermore, I have shown that
dispositional analyses of secondary qualities are incom-
patible with certain strong and recurrent intuitions which
form a basis for attempting a primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction. These considerations, it seems to me, are suffi-
cient to show that this version of a primary-secondary
quality distinction is an unattractive candidate for any
further study.
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CHAPTER V I
In Cha,ptGr I
,
thG LockGan vigw that sGcondary quali —
tiGs arG in somG way dGpGndGnt on primary qualitiGs was
briGfly discussGd. At that timG it was concludGd that LockG
says so littlG about thG concGpt of proporty dopondoncy that
it is not Gasy to find a non-circular criterion with which
to express this version of a primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction. Nevertheless, Locke's intuition that secondary
qualities are somehow dependent on primary qualities suggests
at least three views worth considering: (1) that an object's
secondary qualities are collections of its primary qualities;
(2) that an object's secondary qualities are determined by
or supervenient upon its primary qualities; and (3) that
objects possess primary qualities both macroscopically and
microscopically while they possess secondary qualities only
macroscopically. In this chapter, all three of these views
will be discussed. I shall reject the first on the grounds
that it amounts to a denial of a distinction between primary
and secondary qualities. The second of these, I will say,
is less attractive than the third, which it suggests. Af-
ter discussing the third of these views, I conclude that it
is the most promising of the Lockean-inspired versions of
the primary-secondary quality distinction.
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The first of the three views, that secondary quali-
ties are simply collections of primary qualities, is rela-
tively innocuous. Someone who holds this view would assert
that an object's having a particular determinate color, for
instance, is just its having a surface composed of a certain
kind and number of molecules arranged in a particular way;
an object's having a particular degree of heat is just its
having a certain level of mean molecular kinetic energy, and
so on. There are, of course, classic arguments against
identifying secondary qualities with collections of primary
qualities. One sort of argument asserts that people can
know what it is for an object to be yellow or sweet or foul-
smelling without knowing anything about the molecular struc-
tures of objects and that therefore the properties of being
yellow, sweet, or foul-smelling cannot be identical with the
properties of having such and such particular molecular
structures. Another sort of argument against identifying
secondary qualities with collections of primaries insists
that identical properties must at least be coextensive, yet
there are things that have certain secondary qualities with-
out having the relevant primaries. After-images, for exam-
ple, can be colored although they do not have light-
reflecting surfaces.
Even if we assume that these and other arguments
fail, the position that secondary qualities are collections
of primary qualities does not constitute a primary—secondary
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quality distinction since it is really a complete rejection
such distinction. This view simply identifies the
two kinds of quality.
The second view, that an object's secondary quali-
ties are in some way determined by its primary qualities
seems closer to what Locke has in mind when he suqgests that
secondary qualities are caused by or dependent on the primary
qualities. This view involves three claims: (1) that in
physical objects, primary quality possession is a necessary
condition for secondary quality possession; (2) that the
particular determinate secondary qualities an object has are
determined by the particular determinate primary qualities
it has; and, if it is to be distinguished from the first
view, (3) that none of an object's secondary qualities is
identical with any individual primary quality or any set of
primary qualities that the object has.
In a recent paper^ Jaegwon Kim introduces a notion
of supervenience that will be useful in this context. As
Kim explicates it, supervenience is a relation born by some
families of properties to others. He says.
For any set M of properties we define M# as the
closure of M under the usual Boolean operations.
! ]~That is, M# is the set of all properties
constructible from those in M. . . .
We explain supervenience as follows: a family
M or properties is supervenient on a family N of
properties with respect to a domain D of objects
just in case, necessarily, objects in D which
share all properties in N# will also share all
properties in M# .
^
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Kim's notion of supervenience can be used as a replacement
for the more murky notion of property dependency. We will
say, then, that a property is secondary only if it is a
member of a family of properties which supervenes on another
family of properties, the members of which are primary quali-
ties. If we say that secondary qualities are supervenient
on primary qualities, we imply that necessarily, any two ob-
jects which share all their primary qualities will also
share all their secondary qualities. It is most plausible
to take the term 'necessarily' here to express physical
necessity rather than strict logical necessity. As Kim
points out, the supervenience relation is asymmetric. If
secondary qualities are supervenient on primary qualities,
then it is possible that two physical objects might share
all their determinate secondary qualities while differing
with respect to their determinate primary qualities.
At first glance it seems false that it is physically
necessary that any two objects which share all their primary
qualities share all their secondary qualities. Surely it
is physically possible that there be two wooden one-inch
cubes, each weighing one ounce, each stationary, one red and
one blue; that is, two objects which share all their pri-
mary qualities yet differ in color. In response to this
suggestion it can be argued, however, that if the two cubes
are of different colors, there must be something true of
the surface of one which is not true of the other. Perhaps
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they have been painted with different colors of paint;
presumably blue paint has a molecular structure which dif-
fers somewhat from that of red paint (even if they are both
latex or enamel or whatever). We suppose, then, that an ob-
ject painted blue has, in virtue of that fact, a different
surface molecular structure from that of an object painted
red. We should refine our account of secondary qualities
as supervenient upon primary qualities. We do this, first,
by identifying the set of primary qualities of an object with
its microphysical structure. Chisholm suggests such an
identification v/hen he says,
where Locke speaks of primary qualities of an object,
it may be better to speak of the physical or micro-
scopic structure of the object.
3
The primary qualities, then, are properties such as being
composed of twice as many hydrogen atoms as oxygen atoms, or
possessing three atoms per molecule. The refined thesis
about the secondary qualities is that they are those proper-
ties which supervene upon the microphysical structures of
objects. If this thesis is true, then no two objects could
have the same microphysical structure and differ with regard
to their secondary properties.
As plausible as this thesis is, it does not ade-
quately distinguish among properties at the macroscopic
level, since it is reasonable to suppose that all the tradi-
tional primary qualities of an object supervene upon its
microphysical structure. In that case, all of the tradi-
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tional primary qualities would be secondary. But must we
believe that an object's size, shape, mass and so forth, as
well as its color, odor and the rest are supervenient upon
its microphysical structure? It is almost impossible to be-
lieve otherwise. Kim tries to explain our conviction.
It seems to me that our belief in supervenience is
largely, and often, a combination of metaphysical
convictions and methodological considerations. . . .
Much of our thinking in these matters seems deeply
rooted in the Democritean credo that wholes are
completely determined, causally and ontologically
,
by their parts, that if you make a replica of an
object by putting it together atom by atom, par-
ticle by particle, you get the "same" object.^
It seems that two objects which have the same microphysical
structure cannot differ with regard to any of the properties
we traditionally regard as primary, so the fact of super-
vening upon microphysical structures does not distinguish
the traditional secondary qualities from the traditional
primaries. If we accept supervenience as the distinguishing
mark of secondary qualities, then being spherical, being
seven feet in diameter and moving at one hundred miles per
hour, no less than being red or bitter or soft, turn out to
be secondary qualities. While being such and such a size is
secondary, having atoms of such and such a size is primary.
It is easy to see that this way of distinguishing primar—
from secondary qualities produces a list of primaries radi-
cally different from Locke's. The list of secondaries which
it yields includes many or all of the Lockean primaries.
However, we can preserve the intuition that the
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microphysical structures of physical objects fully determine
their macroscopic properties while maintaining a fairly
traditional version of the primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction. Instead of concentrating on the microstructures
of macroscopic physical objects, we turn to the micro-
constituents of those objects, the elementary particles
which comprise physical objects, and consider their proper-
ties. Locke and others suggest that the basic units of mat-
ter of which physical objects are composed have as proper-
ties the traditional primaries but none of the traditional
secondaries. The elementary particles are supposed to have
shape, size, solidity, mass and mobility while lacking
color, smell, taste, sound, temperature and the like. VJe
might say, then, that a quality is primary just in case it
is a property which is physically essential to the elemen-
tary particles of physical objects. The primary qualities
of macroscopic objects are those which it shares with its
microconstituents. The secondary qualities would be those
physical properties possessed by macroscopic objects but
lacked or possessed only contingently by their elementary
particles. (Pi) and (P2) form an attempt to capture this.
(PI) Quality Q is primary iff (i) Q is contingent
and either (ii) (x) (y) (x is a physical
object and y is an elementary constituent
of X=,[pJ y has Q) or (iii) Q is a deter-
minate or a determinable of some property
that satisfies (i) and (ii)
.
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(P2) Quality Q is secondary iff (i ) <C> (Ex) (x is
physical and x has Q) and (ii) (Ex) (Ey)
is a physical object and y is an elemen-
tary constituent of x and y lacks Q) and(iii) Q fails to fulfil condition (iii) of
(PI) .
In Chapter II, property contingency was defined this way:
Quality Q is contingent iff ^(Ex)(Qx) and <> (Ex) (-Qx) .
An elementary constituent of an object is one which is not
composed of other things; it is a basic particle. An atom,
for example, is not an elementary constituent of any object
since it is composed of a number of other, smaller, entities.
(PI) restricts the primary qualities to those qualities which
all the elementary constituents of physical objects must
possess, so that having an electrical charge, for example,
is a secondary quality, since not all elementary particles
are electrically charged. We might want to weaken the cri-
terion for property primacy. To do this, we must introduce
the rather fuzzy notion of a natural kind of elementary
constituent of objects. It is fruitless to try to make this
notion absolutely clear; we can perhaps elucidate by suggest-
ing that protons and electrons represent two natural kinds
of elementary constituents of objects.
(P3) Quality Q is primary iff (i) Q is contingent
and either (ii) (Ex) (EK) (x is a physical
object and K is a natural kind of elemen-
tary constituent of x and (y) (y is a mem-
ber of KC>[^y has Q) ) or (iii) Q is a
determinate or a determinable of some
property that satisfies (i) and (ii) .
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(P4) Quality Q is secondary iff (i) <) (Ex) (x is
physical and x has Q) and (ii) (x) (y)
(x is a physical object and y is an
elementary constituent of x o y lacks
Q) and (iii) Q fails to fulfil condition
(iii) of (P3)
.
(P3) counts as primary any physically necessary property of
all the members of any kind of elementary constituent of
any physical object, so that if, say, having an electrical
charge is physically essential to one kind of particle,
then having an electrical charge is a primary quality even
if some kinds of elementary constituents of objects lack it.
It is not clear which of the two pairs of criteria
above is preferable. One reason for this is that it is
difficult to reason confidently about v;hich properties are
physically essential to various sorts of elementary par-
ticles. Because of this difficulty, it is not easy to argue
for one pair of criteria over the other on the basis of the
results they yield. Nevertheless, one reason for preferring
(PI) and (P2) might be the conviction that no property
lacked or possessed only contingently by elementary par-
ticles should be considered primary. The idea would be that
the primary qualities are in some sense the ultimate ones,
the ones that none of the fundamental bits of matter could
fail to have. On the other hand, someone might argue that
the primary qualities should be those to which all other
properties are in some way reducible. If it is the case
that some properties physically essential to some but not
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particlGs are not reducible to sets of those
properties which are physically essential to all elementary
particles, then one might prefer to adopt (P3) and (P4).
We can go a short way toward determining the results
of the criteria above by considering what physicists tell
us are the elementary constituents of things and what proper-
ties those particles are thought to have. Since neither
of these issues is to be considered settled, our conclusions
are tentative. Among the elementary particles are protons
and electrons. Neutrons are usually listed among the ele-
mentary particles, yet since single neutrons are in the
habit of breaking down into one electron and one proton
each, it is not clear that neutrons are really elementary.
Both protons and electrons have mass,^ the capability of
motion, solidity, size (and therefore presumably shape) and
electrical charge. Except for the last entry, this list of
properties is remarkably similar to the traditional roll
of primary qualities. The question remains whether all
these properties are physically essential to the particles
that have them. One argument that most of them are is that
anything physical has, necessarily, all of the properties
listed above except electrical charge. If we add that
everything that is physical is so necessarily we can conclude
that these properties are physically essential to elementary
particles since they are metaphysically necessary to them.
Whether having an electrical charge is physically
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6 ss0ntial to anything is a moot point, Thare are particles,
such as the neutrino, which fail to have electrical charge;
this property is not essential to all physical objects.
Whether in all physically possible worlds protons, for
example, are electrically charged is a difficult issue to
decide. I suspect that in all those worlds some sort of
elementary particle or other must have an electrical charge;
whether members of any particular kind must be charged is
another matter.
Employing either (P2) or (P4) appears to yield the
result that color, smell, temperature, taste and sound, as
well as a vast array of other properties, are secondary.
There are two reasons why we might think this is so.
First, since none of the traditional secondaries warrants
a mention in scientific accounts of the nature or behavior
of individual elementary particles, one may conclude on
grounds of ontological economy that the elementary micro-
constituents of objects simply lack these properties. (I
tried to argue in Chapter III that no similar argument is
available in the case of macroscopic objects.) Second, the
accepted explanations of the phenomena of color, heat ,
sound, etc., each involves reference to the behavior of very
large groups of particles; singly, it appears, the elemen-
tary particles have not the wherewithal to be colored or
noisy or sweet. It appears that the traditional secondary
qualities are not physically essential to the elementary
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constituents of physical objects. In Chapter II, I rejected
an attempt to distinguish primary from secondary qualities
which took the former to be essential to bodies and the
latter inessential. I argued then that it is reasonable to
assume that macroscopic objects have certain secondary quali-
ties essentially. At the microscopic level, however, the
scene is different; it appears that the Democritean hint
that the sub-atomic world is colorless, odorless, silent and
so on is correct.
So far, our attempt to distinguish primary from
secondary qualities seems to yield gratifying results. How-
ever, there are some obvious consequences of the criteria
above that are troublesome. (Pi) implies that the property
of being an elementary constituent of a physical object is
primary; (P3) implies that the properties of being an elec-
tron, being a proton and so forth are primary. Both
criteria imply that the property of failing to be a proposi-
tion is primary. Such trivial properties are not usually
considered primary. I see no way to block such results
while preserving the idea that the primary qualities are
those which are physically essential to some or all of the
elementary constituents of objects.
In spite of this difficulty, each of the pairs of
criteria above is a more promising version of a primary-
secondary quality distinction than any we have so far dis-
cussed. We have been searching for a version with at least
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these two features: it should have been hinted at or sug-
gested by Locke (and perhaps some other proponents of a
traditional primary-secondary quality distinction) ; and it
should yield results similar to the Lockean lists of pri-
mary and secondary qualities. That Locke suggests that the
primary qualities are those possessed by the elementary
parts of objects is beyond question. A few quotations from
the Essay should make this plain.
Secondly, such qualities
,
which in truth are nothing
in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce
various sensations in us by their primary Qualities
,
i.e., by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of
their insensible parts .
6
For the power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or
consistency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities,
is as much a quality in Fire, as the power it has
to produce in me a new Idea or Sensation of warmth
or burning, which I felt not before, by the same
primary Qualities, viz. The Bulk, Texture, and
Motion of its insensible parts .
7
sensible Qualities . . . depend on those primary
Qualities, viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion
of parts .
8
Similar views are expressed by Democritus and again recently
by J.L. Mackie.
Material things ... . appear to have many . . .
properties; they differ from one another, we say,
in colour, hardness, temperature, and so on. But
the real differences which these descriptions re-
flect consist wholly in the arrangement and motion
of tiny particles of which these material things
are composed.
^
At least part of the position we are considering has a long
and rather respectable history.
(P2) and (P4) express the view that secondary
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qualities are those qualities not physically essential to
all the elementary constituents of objects. In this respect,
they diverge somewhat from Lockean views on the nature of
secondary qualities. Almost everything Locke says about
secondary qualities entails that they are not essential to
elementary particles; the problem is that he says many other
things about them as well, such as that they fail to resemble
our ideas of them and that they are mere powers of objects.
The present views are mute on questions of idea-property
resemblance and dispositional versus non-dispositional
properties. However, they are sufficiently similar to some
of Locke’s thinking about primary and secondary qualities
that we can safely say that they are at least suggested
by Locke in his Essay .
We have seen, however, that the results yielded by
(PI) and (P2) together and (P3) and (P4) together might
well differ from Lockean lists of primary and secondary
qualities. We have mentioned two problems: (1) it is not
certain in which category the criteria put certain qualities
since it is not certain which properties are physically es-
sential to the elementary constituents of objects; and
(2) (PI) and (P3) judge as primary certain trivial proper-
ties of elementary particles.
The first problem is not so serious that we should
immediately reject the criteria at hand. I have suggested
that all of the Lockean primaries are essential to the ele-
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mentary constituents of objects since they are essential to
all physical entities. If this suggestion is correct, then
at least (PI) and (P3) put all the Lockean primaries in their
proper category. Among other properties which might turn
out to be primary under the criteria we are examining are
having an electrical charge and having a certain degree of
kinetic energy. Suppose an argument could be produced to
show that these two properties and perhaps others, as yet
unknown, are physically essential to some or all elementary
particles, so that they should be counted among the pri-
maries. We should not take this as constituting a serious
divergence from the Lockean position inasmuch as the expan-
sion of the list of primaries would be a result of post-
Lockean discoveries in the physical sciences rather than a
shift away from Locke's philosophical intuitions. It is
not surprising that physicists might discover microphysical
properties unknown to Locke and that consequently, the list
of primaries might be lengthened as scientific knowledge
increases. At the same time, to discover that one of the
traditional secondaries is essential to elementary particles
V70uld indeed be disastrous for the position we are consider-
ing, but, for reasons alluded to above, we ought to be con-
fident that that will not happen.
The second problem is more serious. In counting
some trivial properties among the primaries, both pairs of
criteria are defective and, as I have suggested, the defect
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may not be eliminable. Whether the difficulty is grave
enough to warrant complete rejection of the criteria is
debatable. In Chapter II, we dismissed the view that pri-
mary qualities are those which are essential to macroscopic
objects. Part of the reason for this dismissal was that
certain trivial properties of macroscopic objects would,
according to that view, be primary. It appears that for
similar reasons, (P1)-(P4) ought to be rejected now. How-
ever, the situations differ in at least one respect. The
final view discussed in Chapter II had other very serious
defects, while so far, we have found no overwhelming prob-
lems with (Pl)-(P4).
A third problem with the two sets of criteria is
that they enormously expand the list of secondary qualities.
Many of the properties on the expanded list, such as being
corrosive and being slippery, are properties that Locke
would undoubtedly call tertiary. At one point he describes
the tertiaries as secondaries, mediately perceived, so to
count such properties among the secondaries is not a radical
departure from Locke. Other properties, such as having been
created by Leonardo da Vinci, which are not Lockean ter-
tiaries, would also be included in the expanded list of
secondaries. This, of course, does represent a significant
departure from the Lockean results.
In spite of the failure of either (Pi) and (P2)
or (P3) and (P4) to yield lists of primary and secondary
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id©ntical to Locko's list, it is notablG that both
sets of criteria appear to yield the result that all of the
Lockean primaries are primary and all of the Lockean secon-
daries are secondary. No other view we have considered has
succeeded in this. All of the views we have examined have
more or less reflected some bit of Lockean thinking on pri-
mary and secondary qualities; in that respect, they are all
satisfactory. But none has been as satisfactory in its re-
sults. Therefore, I conclude, either (PI) and (P2) or
(P3) and (P4) represents the best development of the Lockean
distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Footnotes
1. "Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables ,
"
American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 15, Number 2,
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3. Perceiving (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969),
p. 126.
4. op. cit .
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p. 154.
5. For mass, it would probably be best to substitute the
notion of mass-energy.
6. II,viii,10, emphasis mine.
7. Ibid . , emphasis mine.
8. II,viii,14, emphasis mine.
9. Problems From Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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CHAPTER VII
It is t0mpting to believB that one of the reasons
why philosophers continue to talk about Locke's primary-
secondary quality distinction is that they suspect that in
making it, Locke was at least approaching some truth about
the nature of physical objects. I have tried to show that
there is no one clear property distinction in the Lockean
texts that we can point to and confidently identify as the
Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Rather, there are several independent quality distinctions
suggested in Locke's writings on the subject. What we have
been searching for is a version of a primary-secondary qual-
ity distinction that, one, is at least suggested by Locke,
two, yields results in accord with Locke's, and three, has
defensible implications about the nature or properties of
physical objects. In short, we have been trying to find a
Lockean version of the primary-secondary quality distinc-
tion which merits the attention that Locke's meanderings on
this matter have received.
Many proposals have been discussed and rejected.
They fall into five categories. First, there are proposals
that the primary qualities of macroscopic physical objects
are essential to them while their secondary qualities are
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not. I argued that the chief problem with these lies in
the difficulty of establishing that none of the secondary
qualities is essential to the physical objects that have
them. I suggested that at least some of the traditional
secondary qualities are in fact essential to physical ob-
jects. Second, there are versions of a primary-secondary
quality distinction which identify the primary qualities
as the "real" properties of physical objects and the secon-
dary qualities as those which are instantiated only by men-
tal entities and which only apparently qualify physical en-
tities. Besides the fact that this view is not a distinc-
tion among the properties of physical objects, it is, I
argued, impossible to defend in a non-question-begging way.
This insight is Berkeley's, not mine. A third set of
proposals involves the notion of resemblance between a
sense-datum and a physical object. The sense-data associ-
ated with the primary qualities of objects are said to re-
semble those objects in some way that the sense-data
associated with the secondary qualities do not. I argued
that this suggestion is pretty well incoherent. A fourth
proposal concerns property changes in physical objects.
It is suggested that objects can gain or lose secondary
qualities without undergoing any physical alteration while
no similar feat is possible in the case of its primary
qualities. I dismissed this view on the grounds that it
makes assumptions about the nature of secondary qualities
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which, if made explicit, would constitute part of one of
the other versions of the primary-secondary quality dis-
tinction. Since this fourth proposal cannot profitably be
dealt with in isolation, I gave it brief attention. The
fifth set of proposals discussed takes secondary qualities
to be dispositions. Then, either the primary qualities are
said to be non-dispositional or they are said to be dis-
positions, but of a different sort from the secondary quali-
ties. Here I argued that it is difficult to find a good
argument to show that secondary qualities are dispositions
that does not tend to show that primary qualities are dis-
positions, and that if we decide that all of the properties
of physical objects are dispositional, and then try to
divide them up in some likely way, we produce lists of pri-
mary and secondary qualities which are quite diverse from
Locke's own lists. Although each of these proposals is sug-
gested by Locke, none of them fulfils all three of the cri-
teria mentioned above. Each proposal either is unclear,
fails to yield acceptable results, or implies something
improbable about some of the properties of physical objects.
Some of the proposals suffer from more than one of these
defects
.
Each of a final set of proposals is more or less
loosely connected to the notion of property dependency. One
of these proposals I found to be more meritorious than the
others. The view (roughly stated) that the primary quali-
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ties of objects are those which are physically essential to
their microconstituents and that the secondary qualities of
objects are those of their properties their microconstituents
either completely lack or possess only contingently comes
closest to meeting the standards which informed my entire
search. The view is certainly suggested by Locke; it
yields results which are comfortably similar to Locke's own;
and it has no bizarre implications about the nature of ob-
jects or their properties.
I wish to point to some other features of this view.
First, it does not entail any of the others I discussed. It
does not imply that secondary qualities are inessential to
physical objects, that they are subjective, that objects
can easily gain and lose them, or that they are disposi-
tional. It does not imply that primary qualities bear
some resemblance to sense-data that secondary qualities do
not. Second, the view I have endorsed is independent of any
particular theory of perception; most notably, it does not
pre-suppose any version of the much-maligned Representative
theory of perception. Third, it is pretty much independent
of all of the epistemological tangles that have strangled
fruitful discussion about the nature of physical objects.
Fourth, it defers in an appropriate way to the physicist;
it is he who must tell us what properties elementary par-
ticles have. Fifth, it leaves open certain questions con-
cerning the proper analysis of the properties of physical
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objects. Some might consider this a defect; I consider it
a virtue. The question whether, for instance, 'red' ex-
presses a light-reflecting disposition, a disposition to
produce certain kinds of sensations in sentient creatures,
the property of having a particular kind of surface struc-
ture, or all three, quickly leads to other questions which
seem far removed from Locke's major concern, which is to
discover the relationships that obtain among some of the
apparent properties of physical objects. This is not to say
that Locke's discussion is not too simplistic; nor is it to
say that we should not distress ourselves with these diffi-
cult questions, only that we may take legitimate pleasure
in being able to say something significant about primary
and secondary qualities that does not force a stand on
those other distinct issues. Finally, the view I have en-
dorsed is compatible with and even dimly suggests the at-
tractive position that an object's microstructure fully
determines its macroscopic properties. This compatibility
frees and encourages us to attempt a reduction of statements
about the macroscopic properties of objects to statements
about the properties of its microconstituents.
It would be gratifying to be able to argue in good
conscience that the view I find most acceptable is the one
Locke "really had in mind" and that anything he said to the
contrary represents a momentary lapse of some sort on his
part. I cannot do this. I believe that Locke was genuinely
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confused about this issue and that his befuddlement was
caused by his inattention to the mistakes of his predeces-
sors, who freely and carelessly tossed unrelated and some-
times irrelevant ontological and epistemological considera-
tions into their discussions of primary and secondary quali-
ties.
In this project, my aim has been to provide some
historical clarification, to clear away some of the confused
or misleading considerations that have surrounded an impor-
tant strand in the development of philosophical speculation
about the nature of physical objects. In addition, I have
tried to demonstrate that when the deadwood has been removed,
there is something of interest and value to be discovered in
Locke's work on primary and secondary qualities.
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